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Abstract 1 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
From Nature to Freedom: Kant on the Transition from the Sensible to the 
Supersensible through Reflective Judgement 
Submitted by CHAN, Chun Hang Henry 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2005 
This thesis is a philosophical reflection of one of the systematic problems of Kant's 
philosophy, namely, one which has to do with the demand of a supersensible 
substrate that supposedly would ground the very possibility of critical philosophy. I 
have in this thesis argued that critical philosophy, which is reason's self-reflection of 
the boundary of its own employment, requires reason to have certain connection to 
the realm of the supersensible substrate. The required supersensible substrate cannot 
be an object of cognition because it cannot be given through sensibility, and for Kant 
all cognition necessarily requires two components, namely, that which is given 
sensibly in intuition and that which pertain to the pure concepts of understanding. As 
a result of this, the demanded supersensible substrate could only be problematically 
presupposed in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason, 
Kant showed us further that reason's real connection to the supersensible substrate 
lies in human practice, and freedom was revealed as the sole legitimate candidate for 
establishing such a connection. 
From the results mentioned above, I have argued that there is a tension between 
the presupposed supersensible substrate in the first Critique and the supersensible 
substrate practically determined as freedom in the second Critique. I argued that the 
reconciliation of this tension is the major aim of Critique of Power of Judgement. 
Kant thought that it is due to certain peculiarity of human cognitive power that we 
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need to reflectively judge nature as being purposive. This power of reflective 
judgement makes it possible for us to analogically judge nature as having an 
intuitive understanding as its substrate. This intuitive understanding as the 
supersensible substrate of all reality, Kant suggested, could reconcile the conflict 
between nature and freedom, the infamous Kantian duality within his system. 
Towards the end of the thesis, after an interpretive account of the reflective 
power of judgement, I have evaluated the idea of the supersensible substrate 
clarified by Kant in the third Critique. I argued that the idea of the supersensible 
Kant provided in the third Critique might not be a satisfactory answer for the 
systematic problem I had formulated in the beginning of this thesis. However, I 
wanted to show that despite this theoretical shortfall the systematic problem could 
still remain a genuine problem, which led to the successive development of idealistic 
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Introduction 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Human reason has peculiar fate in one kind of its 
cognitions: it is troubled by questions that it cannot dismiss, 
because they are posed to it by the nature of reason itself, 
but that it also cannot answer, because they surpass human 
reason's every ability. 
Our reason falls into this perplexity through no fault of its 
own. Reason starts from principles that it cannot avoid 
using in the course of experience, and that this experience 
at the same time sufficiently justifies it in using. By means 
of these principles our reason (as indeed its nature requires 
it to do) ascends ever higher, to more remote conditions. 
But it becomes aware that in this way, since the questions 
never cease, its task must remain forever uncompleted. 
Thus it finds itself compelled to resort to principles that go 
beyond all possible use in experience, and that nonetheless 
seem so little suspect that even common human reason 
agrees with them. By doing this, however, human reason 
plunges into darkness and contradictions; and although it 
can indeed gather from these that they must be based on 
errors lying hidden somewhere, it is unable to discover 
these errors. For the principles that it employs go beyond 
the boundary of all experience and hence no longer 
acknowledge any touchstone of experience. The combat 
arena of these endless conflicts is what we call metaphysics. 
(CPR，Aviif.) 
From the above passage, Kant started off his great enterprise of critical philosophy. 
Critical philosophy as reason's self reflection has a peculiar structure and specific 
aims. Kant told us from the very beginning that reason has a peculiar fate\ its 
principles are necessary elements of experience, yet these principles could naturally 
surpass human experience and wander off to the land where there are only darkness 
and contradictions. This very structure of human reason puts us in a very difficult 
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situation: we cannot dismiss the use of reason once and for all, in order to keep 
ourselves away from darkness and contradictions, because experience as our secure 
homeland is somehow, at least indirectly, supported by these principles of reason. 
However, these principles of reason, if misused, could lead us away from our 
homeland ending up eventually in darkness. As a result, the very problem of reason 
is how it should be used. It is necessary to set boundaries to reason's uses, not 
allowing it to lead us astray. On the other hand, this bounding of reason must not 
become an execution of reason. If reason is to be executed, the foundation of our 
experience would be threatened. It is due to this peculiar fate of reason that a very 
special kind of philosophical reflection is needed. The specific aim of such 
philosophy would be setting bounds to reason's uses while giving it its legitimate 
right of employment in our experience. 
With this specific aim in mind, we need to find a proper way for its 
achievement. Living within this homeland of experience, we process no touchstone 
for truth except our own experience itself. The legitimacy of all other human 
endeavours, for instance, natural sciences, could be tested with this touchstone of 
experience. However, the legitimacy of reason's "more speculative" uses is so 
enigmatic that it presents itself as a totally different problem. Of course, experience 
could set a limit to these uses of reason; however，it is almost certain that reason, out 
of its natural disposition, does go beyond that limit. And any attempt to deny 
altogether these uses of reason beyond experience is just like strangling it to death. 
As a result, we cannot limit the uses of reason merely by the touchstone of 
experience, because within the standpoint of experience, anything that goes beyond 
it would be false and illusive. Universal empiricism can never be a fair judge to 
reason's limit. 
It seems that we need a judge that is not entirely limited to the standpoint of 
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experience to decide the fate of reason's uses. To be fair, this judge must be one that 
could go beyond experience to a certain extent, yet still complies with the empirical 
touchstone of truth. Kant found that this fair judge could be no one except reason 
itself. Reason is the sole human power that is not confined to experience alone, and 
for our examination here, reason itself would be the only able judge. However, it 
must always remind itself that experience is the sole "Land of Truth," and it should 
never abuse its ability and wander off from this land. This led to the peculiar 
structure of critical philosophy, as reason's self reflection of its own bounds. 
In order to examine the bound of reason's uses through the touchstone of 
experience, reason must in the first step survey this very homeland of experience. 
This work constituted the first half of Kant's major work, Critique of Pure Reason. 
Here，reason limits its own uses by critically clarifying and distinguishing all the 
principles of experience. As a result, reason discovered that within the land of 
experience, it has no constituting rule to play. Should it then abandon its own uses 
entirely? Obviously the answer is negative. For reason also found that, beyond the 
constitution of knowledge there are some problematic roles to play. Kant accounted 
for this issue in the second half of the first Critique, namely, the "Transcendental 
Dialectic.，’ 
This problematic role of reason cannot justify its uses sufficiently. For this 
point I will argue in the first chapter of this thesis. Up to this point, I only wanted to 
point out the peculiar fate of human reason, namely, that only reason itself could 
decide on its own fate, because it is the only power of human intellect that is not 
entirely limited to the sensible world of experience. Using Kant's own formulation, 
reason is "neither locked inside the sensible world nor adrift outside it" (Proleg, 150, 
IV，361). This nature of reason, positively speaking, means a connection to the 
supersensible. This very connection of reason to the supersensible will be one of the 
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guiding threads of this thesis. 
As I have mentioned above, the problematic role of reason in the first Critique 
can in no way justify its uses. I will, moreover, argue that if the role of reason 
remains problematic, it will threaten the possibility of critical philosophy itself. As a 
result, Kant must find another way to establish reason's "real" use. He found that it 
is through human practice that this "reality" of reason is revealed. 
However, problems will remain even if Kant could establish reason's reality in 
human practice. I will argue that, between the problematic presupposition of 
reason's role in the first Critique, where nature is grounded, and the reality of reason 
as practical freedom, there is still a tension. This tension is the infamous duality 
between nature and freedom, as a result of the first two Critiques. It is commonly 
thought that the writing of the third Critique is a solution Kant tried to provide to 
resolve this tension. 
Before introducing each chapter, I shall here explain the flow of argument of 
this thesis. As mentioned above, for critical philosophy, where reason reflects on its 
own limit, it is a necessity to avoid contradictions and illusion in human cognition. I 
will show that, in this sort of critical reflection, reason must be shown to have 
certain connection to the supersensible. This connection to the supersensible of 
reason, on the one hand, serves certain regulative roles of human cognition; on the 
other hand, it is the very condition of possibility of reason's self-reflection. In the 
search for the condition of possibility of nature, i.e. in the writing of first Critique, 
the connection to the supersensible of reason is shown to have a problematic status. 
It is "presupposed," not cognized. As I have mentioned before, it was in the 
transcendental account of human practice that Kant could establish the real 
connection of reason to the supersensible. The only legitimate supersensible for 
human beings is shown there as freedom. 
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From the above we can see that so far the problem of the supersensible emerged 
in two fashions, one of them as the presupposed problematic supersensible that is 
demanded in nature and necessary for critical philosophy, and the other as the 
established supersensible in the form of practical freedom. I will show that these two 
ideas of supersensible have entirely different senses and status, which requires some 
way to be unified into a system. Kant wanted to show that, there is another power of 
cognition that makes this unification possible, and that is the power of judgement. 
Kant tried to prove that this very power of judgement is the power of cognition 
that unifies nature and freedom in a supersensible substrate of reality. This substrate 
of reality, though not cognizable, as it is supersensible, is legitimately presumed due 
to certain peculiarity of human cognitive powers, will be accounted for. 
After explicating the different problems mentioned here, I will evaluate briefly 
the consequences of Kant's reflection of his system through an analysis of the power 
of judgement. I will show that, from a certain point of view, there are still problems 
to be solved in Kant's account. Moreover, I will show that there has been a trend in 
contemporary studies of Kant's third Critique that intentionally evades the 
systematic problem of Kantian philosophy and redirects the aim of the third Critique 
away from this problem. I will show that this might not be a plausible interpretation 
of the third Critique. In other words, one could still legitimately demand from the 
third Critique an answer to the systematic problem. 
This thesis consists of four chapters. In the first chapter I will give a detailed 
account of the emergence of the supersensible in the first two Critiques. I will show 
that a systematic problem is left over. In the second chapter I will concentrate on an 
interpretive account of the aesthetic judgement. This interpretive account of taste 
will unveil the principle of the power of judgement as a heautonomous a priori 
principle. This will grant the power of judgement the right as an a priori power that 
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could possibly unify the system of the mind. This also serves as a preparation for the 
discussion of the teleological judgement in chapter three. In chapter three, I will 
account for Kant's discussion of teleological judgement, where it will be shown that 
due to certain peculiarity of human cognitive power, it is necessary for us to judge 
nature as purposive and to refer it to an intuitive understanding as its basis. If this 
reference to the supersensible substrate of reality as intuitive understanding is shown 
to be legitimate in some manner, then nature and freedom could possibly reconciled 
in certain way. However, I will in the last chapter show that several theoretical 
consequences of Kant's treatment of the supersensible through reflective judgement 
might render the reconciliation unsatisfactory. This unsatisfactory result might be 
one of the causes of the subsequent development of idealistic and romantic 
philosophy after Kant. I will also in chapter four account for some contemporary 
strategies of interpreting Kant's system. I will show that these interpreting strategies 
could not save Kant from the systematic problem of his philosophy, and that a 
positive answer is still desirable. 
Before proceeding any further there are several points concerning this thesis I 
would like to point out here. I do not want to defend all aspects of Kant's 
philosophical system; indeed, there will be moments that I will show scepticism 
towards certain points of his philosophy. After two centuries of Kantian research, 
many aspects of his philosophy could have been challenged, including areas such as 
moral philosophy, aesthetics, teleology in relation to natural sciences, etc. I will at 
certain points of this thesis unavoidably touch upon such disputes. What I will do is 
to try my very best to reconstruct a coherent picture of Kant's system, in order to 
sharpen the problems he was facing and the possible solutions he has provided. I 
think it is a maxim of philosophical research that we should try to make sense of 
others，thinking first before proceeding to any evaluation or criticism. I hope that I 
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will be guided by this maxim in the foUowing pages. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Supersensible in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of 
Practical Reason 
’，Wir suchen uberall das Unbedingte, und 
finden immer nur Dinge." 
Novalis, Vermischte Bemerkungen 
I. Introduction 
Although Kant only in his third Critique, namely the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, ‘ explicitly mentioned the concept of the supersensible substrate 
{ubersinnliches Substrat), this conception had already emerged and had been 
properly formulated in both the first and the second Critique. It is probably well 
known that Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason granted the reality of the 
"suprasensible use of the categories {ubersinnlichen Gebrauche der Kategorien)...in 
regard to the objects of pure practical reason" (CPrR, 8，V’ 5); while any speculative 
use of the categories to the supersensible is utterly denied. The basis of this denial is 
Kant's setting of limitation of all human theoretical cognition to "the whole of all 
possible experience" {das Ganze aller mdglichen Erfahrung) (CPR, A146/B185) in 
the first Critique; beyond that whole (das Ganze) all application of the categories 
could either be speculative^ or practical. All theoretical cognition beyond that whole 
of possible experience has “no signification (Bedeutung) that could yield a concept 
1 Although I primarily use the translation of Pluhar and that he translated the title of Kant's Kritik der 
Urtheilskraft as “Critique of Judgment", I do think that "Critique of the Power of Judgment" ’ as used 
by the Cambridge edition, is a better translation. The reason for my preference will be given in 
Chapter Two. 
2 Kant tells us that speculative application of the categories is "a theoretical cognition...concerns 
such an object, or such concepts of an object, as one cannot reach in any experience. It is contrasted 
with cognition of nature, which concern no objects or predicates of objects other than those that can 
be given in a possible experience." (CPR, A634/B662) 
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of the object" (CPR, A147/B186). It is because in any theoretical cognition, an 
intuition is needed for the givenness as the content of cognition (CPR, A247/B304)， 
and the only kind of intuition that is possible for human beings is that of the sensible. 
In the supersensible realm we are not capable of having any intuition at all. All 
application of categories without the givenness of sensible intuition would only be 
left with the mere "logical function" (CPR, A239/B298), which is indeterminate and 
hence no cognition could arise from there. As a result, it implies that the 
supersensible could only be determined practically, i.e. through the will (CPrR, 8，V， 
5); while theoretically speaking the supersensible is indeterminable, as without 
sensible determination (through transcendental schema) no theoretical cognition is at 
all possible.^ 
However, one should not overlook the fact that Kant spent almost half of the 
first Critique treating the problem of transcendental dialectic. Although Kant had 
abandoned the speculative use of our cognitive powers and ascribed all 
unconditional objects of reason illusive, he eventually came up with a conception of 
the regulative employment of the transcendental ideas (CPR, A642-668/B670-696). 
The supersensible transcendental ideas now serve our cognition as regulative 
principles which “direct the understanding to a certain goal" (CPR, A644/B672). An 
examination of the chapters of "Transcendental Dialectic," as a result, would help us 
make sense of the meaning of the supersensible to human theoretical cognition, 
although it cannot itself be a theoretical cognition. This will be the first step to take 
upon making sense of the emergence of the supersensible in the first Critique. We 
shall see that the supersensible in the Critique of Pure Reason emerges as a 
problematic concept, as it contains no contradiction yet having no objective reality 
3 For the discussion of Kant's distinction between "the determinate" and "the indeterminate" see 
Seung-Kee Lee, "The Determinate-Indeterminate Distinction and Kant's Theory of Judgment," 
Kant-Studien 95 (2004): 204-225. 
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whatsoever (CPR, A254/B310). Only through practical determination could the 
objective reality of the supersensible be restored; and in order to understand that we 
will have to look at how Kant investigated into the problem of practice and freedom 
in the second Critique. That will form the second part of this chapter. 
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II. Brief Survey to the Scholarships on the "Dialectic" 
In a well known letter to Christian Garve in 1798 Kant mentioned that it had been 
the Antinomy of Pure Reason that "first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and 
drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the ostensible 
contradiction of reason with itself (Letters, 552，XII，258)/ From the above 
citation we could have seen the importance of the transcendental dialectic to Kant's 
critical project; yet it is not always the case. In earlier Kantian scholarships, such as 
that of Jonathan Bennett and P. F. Strawson, there were explicit ignorance and 
indifference to the theoretical significance of the transcendental dialectic in Kant's 
philosophy. Strawson held a more modest, nevertheless sceptical, attitude towards 
the "Dialectic". In his famous book on Kant's first Critique, he pointed out that there 
are "a number of interdependent objectives" ^ to be achieved through the 
philosophical reflection of the problem of transcendental dialectic. However, 
according to his interpretation, the project turned out to be a failure; at least it was 
not what Kant had wanted it to be. 
These bright prospects are, as we shall see, considerably clouded 
in the outcome. All that is actually achieved is negative. 
Bennett criticized Kant's treatment of the transcendental dialectic with the writing of 
a monograph. 7 In his work of almost 300 pages, he analysed and criticized 
thoroughly the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the chapters of the transcendental 
dialectic, and hence came to conclude that the chapters are "essentially negative" 
4 See also the footnote to (Proleg, 131, IV，341)，where Kant asked us to concern oneself principally 
"with this antinomy, because nature itself seems to have set it up to make reason suspicious in its bold 
claims and to force a self-examination." 
5 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 155. 
6 Ibid.’ p. 156. 
7 Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 
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and that '^ve cannot take too seriously Kant's remark about ‘the proper problem of 
o 
pure reason，，or the account of the Critique's structure which goes with it." 
A mere negative outcome of the transcendental dialectic would not have 
rendered its necessary theoretical status within the framework of Kant's critical 
philosophy. 9 Kant could have just argued against all non-sensible cognition as 
illegitimate and closed his discussion without writing the part of "Dialectic." Hence, 
we have reason to believe that Kant was there treating an issue with philosophical 
weight. It is especially clear with Kant's treatment of the antinomy of reason. 
Cosmological ideas, which arise out of the antinomy of reason, have the peculiarity 
that the solution to the problems of the ideas lies in the ideas themselves (CPR, 
A497/B507). The reason for that assertion is that all other transcendental ideas, 
namely that of the paralogisms of pure reason and that of the ideal of pure reason, 
presuppose objects that are impossible to be given {ibid., note). Hence we can 
resolve the illusion of these ideas through showing that they refer to an impossible 
object of intuition. However, cosmological ideas spring solely from the infinite 
advance of empirical synthesis driven by reason itself. The objects and the empirical 
synthesis can be presupposed as given; the problem of these ideas is only that the 
totality presupposed as the goal of the advance is no longer empirical, and that any 
theoretical cognition to that totality is essentially false {ibid.). We are in the position 
to see that the antinomy of reason is precisely the way reason contradicts with itself, 
and a solution to this transcendental problem must be capable of being solved {ibid., 
A476/B504). A contradictory reason would imply that "we would have no reason at 
all, but without reason would have no coherent use of the understanding, and in the 
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
9 Otfried Hoffe pointed out that the "Dialectic" should have done more than that of destroying 
metaphysics, see Otfried HofFe, Immanuel Kant, Marshall Farrier trans., (USA: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), pp. 110-111. 
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absence of such use would have no sufficient mark of empirical truth.，，{ibid., 
A651/B679) 
From the above remarks, we could now see that if Kant's account of the 
dialectic of reason turned out to be merely negative, then we would have reasons to 
become advocates of s c e p t i c i s m . � Although I do not want to defend Kant against 
the criticism by those earlier scholarships here, as it will definitely be a task that 
requires writing of several monographs to complete，" I do want to propose another 
way of evaluating Kant's works on the dialectic of reason, especially that of the 
antinomy. I do think that the discussion of the antinomy of reason, where Kant 
stresses its sources as reason itself, should not have taken us back to a Humean 
scepticism. If Kant had written a negative account of reason's dialectic just for the 
sake of confirming Humean scepticism, he would have been one of the stupidest 
writers in the history of thoughts. Moreover, if he had been witty enough, he should 
have stopped immediately after the writing of the "Analytic" to avoid the danger of 
contradicting himself. ^ ^ As a result, we have reasons to believe that Kant certainly 
has something to say with the bunch of writing in the "Dialectic". I think that the 
chapter on antinomy is of special importance to Kant's transcendental idealism, 
upon distinguishing the sensible and the supersensible elements in human cognition. 
Explicating this transcendental distinction would help us understand better the 
character of the supersensible elements, which is one of the major themes of this 
Some scholars have pointed out that it was the problem of scepticism that induced the critical turn 
of philosophy and German idealism; see Onora O'Neill, "Vindicating Reason," In The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant, Paul Guyer ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Michael 
Baur, "The Role of Skepticism in the Emergence of German Idealism," In The Emergence of German 
Idealism, Michael Baur and Daniel O. Dahlstrom ed., (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1999). 
1 ‘ One could look at the works of the contemporary Kant scholar, Henry E. Allison, who critically 
defended Kant against older challenges. 
12 Kant even mentioned that if the task of the critique of reason is only to prove the empirical use of 
understanding, which we nevertheless practise wiAout any problem, then “the advantage obtained 
from that inquiry does not seem worth the expense and the apparatus." (CPR, A237/B296) See also 
Proleg, 123, IV，331. 
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thesis. As a result, I shall in the later part of this chapter give an account of the 
antinomy of reason. I do hope that through this we can come to appreciate more the 
fruitful writings in the "Dialectics" of the three CritiquesP 
My stress on the positive interpretation of the dialectic of reason and on the 
importance of the supersensible in Kant's philosophy is not without support from 
Kantian scholarship. Karl Ameriks pointed out that we are now at the age of the 
"third wave of Kant scholars，，，!^  where they have “the special merit of combining 
the historical concerns of the nineteenth century with the demands for clarity and 
relevance raised in the twentieth century." ^ ^ In contrary to our contemporary 
Kantian scholarship, the "second wave" of scholarship which includes Strawson and 
Bennett left "most of the original context of Kant's work out of sight，"6 and 
concerned merely the first half of the first Critique” The "second wave" scholars 
concerned themselves mostly with the problematic of the analytic philosophy and 
hoped that relevant materials could be found in the "Analytic" of the first Critique. 
That is probably the reason why they could not have appreciated the "Dialectics" of 
Kant and also his notions of the supersensible realm of human experience. However, 
the contemporary "third wave" scholars like Henry E. Allison and Dieter Henrich 
took a different stance. Allison in his various works pointed out the theoretical 
importance of the antinomy to Kant's account of transcendental idealism and 
13 Indeed Gottfried Martin in his early writing on Kant pointed out that the doctrine of antinomies 
has been judged very differently by people witii different concerns. It is, to him, a matter of how one 
sees the importance of the problem of antinomy, and he proposed that "every interpretation should 
therefore try to bring out not the formal correctness of what is stated but rather the genuine ground of 
the problems." (Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, P. G. Lucas trans., (New 
York: Barnes & Nobles，Inc., 1955)，p. 51.) I basically have taken this stance proposed by Martin and 
hope to connect the doctrine of antinomy of reason to the problem of the supersensible, where details 
are to be discussed in Chapter Four. 
14 Karl Ameriks, Interpreting Kant's Critiques, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 1. 
Ibid, p. 2. 
16 Ibid, p. 1. 
17 Ibid. 
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freedom. 18 Henrich reminded us that freedom is actually the "keystone"'^ of Kant's 
system of philosophy; hence any interpretation overlooking this point would fail to 
appreciate the fullest sense of Kant's systematic work. Moreover, Henrich has 
stressed on the aspect of "ascent"^® of Kant's understanding of philosophy. This 
implies the systematic unity of philosophy and the need of systematization through 
ascent, or transition (Ubergang) (CJ, 436, XX, 246) from the sensible to the 
supersensible. This would further mean that we cannot come to appreciate Kant's 
work without taking serious the system he worked out and taking the ascending path 
together with him. As a result, we need to critically work out how Kant has strived 
towards the supersensible through the writing of the three Critiques. I shall now 
proceed with my discussion on the emergence of the supersensible in the Critique of 
Pure Reason in the following. 
18 See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983)，pp. 35-61，310-329，Kant's Theory of Freedom, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 11-82, and "Practical and Transcendental 
Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason." Kant-Studien 73 (1982): 271-290. 
19 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, David S. Pacini ed., 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 54. Kant himself 
mentioned that in CPrR, 5，V，3. 
20 See Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, p. 53, 60; and Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of 
the World: Studies in Kant, (Stanford, California: Stanford University press, 1992), p. 23. 
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III. The Supersensible in the first Critique: A Problematic Emergence of the 
Transcendental Ideas 
As mentioned before, although it is advisable not to interpret Kant's account of 
dialectic of reason merely negatively, the supersensible can only be presupposed 
problematically as regulative ideas of reason in theoretical cognition. Problematic 
concept, or idea, here refers to those concepts which can never be instantiated as 
theoretical cognition, because no intuition can be given as instance to them. 
Nevertheless, they are postulated (CPR，A509/B537) for the theoretical cognition as 
its regulative principle. 
There are actually three paths which open up this problematic of the 
supersensible. First of all, an investigation of the supersensible ideas of reason is a 
theoretical necessity. Kant in the "Introduction" of the first Critique pointed out that 
a critique of reason where reason "deals with problems that issue entirely from its 
own womb，，(CPR, B23) must in the end let reason itself "determine[s], completely 
and safely, the range and the bounds (Grenzen) of its use [when] attempted beyond 
all bounds of experience.” ( i b i d . f � I shall argue that this bounds determination 
implies theoretically an investigation of the ideas. Secondly, as mentioned above, it 
is the self-contradictions of reason in the antinomies which open up the prospect of 
the supersensible substrate of our cognition, although problematically only. This 
confirms the bounds determining character of reason, where the sensible and the 
supersensible must be distinguished properly, although not without relations, or else 
self-contradiction of reason is inevitable. Thirdly, the ideas of reason are actually 
used igebrauchen) in a regulative fashion, aiming at "the systematic unity of the 
cognitions of understanding" (CPR, A647/B675). The systematic unity of cognitions 
“ S e e also Reena Mookerjee. ..A Note on the Notion of ‘Kritik’’” Kant-Studien 63 (1972)： 369-373. 
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is to Kant "the touchstone of the truth of the rules." {ibid.f^ Not only have I found 
that these three interrelated paths are the strongest arguments Kant had offered for 
the emergence of the supersensible, moreover, they paved the way for the later 
treatment of reflective judgement as the transition towards to supersensible substrate. 
How they are related to reflective judgement, I shall leave it for later discussion; I 
shall now discuss these paths in the following. 
Bound determination and Reason 
Kant limits human theoretical cognition to the realm of empirical. The givenness of 
intuition and the thinking through categories are necessary in their conjunction to 
give objects of theoretical cognition. Kant consistently defends and follows this 
dual-stem principle of theoretical cognition throughout his critical period. Yet, in 
numerous occasions Kant stated that the supersensible ideas of reason, which lack 
any givenness and hence cannot be an object of theoretical cognition, are to be 
presupposed problematically. The necessity of giving an account of these 
problematic ideas, I think, can be considered from the perspective of the task of the 
critique of reason. As quoted above, one of the major tasks of the critique of reason 
is to determine the bounds of reason's uses. Reason, as a faculty of principle (CPR, 
A299/B356), is to be itself disciplined}^ After a critical investigation of the 
22 Altered translation to Pluhar, as the German original reads:，JDer hypothetische Vemunftgebrauch 
geht also auf die systematische Einheit der Verstandeserkenntnisse, diese aber ist der Probirstein der 
Wahrheit der Regeln.“ (CPR, A647/B675) 
23 Here reason takes the sense of a general power of legislation a priori, in contrast to the faculty of 
reason as a technical term where that is the source of illusion and was treated in the part of 
"Transcendental Dialectic." Reason, as a power of cognition out of principle (Logic, 25), legislates in 
different domains of human activities. It is more evident that in (CPR, A711/B739) Kant used the 
term "reason" loosely, when he told us that reason needs no critique of its own power in its empirical 
and mathematical uses. The former use refers to the a priori power of understanding, where the latter 
refers to the a priori power of sensibility (See also PE, 364，XX, 273). As a result, a critique of pure 
reason should be understood as a critical investigation of all human powers of legislation a priori, 
which implies setting bounds to all these different powers and limiting their uses. See also (CJ, 391， 
XX，200) for the idea of a critique of pure reason. Hence, it is also a further clue showing that a 
critique of reason is not merely a task of limiting reason's use and avoiding illusions, of which, might 
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condition of possibility of cognition, Kant showed that human conceptual power in 
general can yield legitimate theoretical cognition only within the use of determining 
sensible intuitions. Hence, a bound (Grenze) is set to the power of thinking. 
Although in the chapter of transcendental schematism Kant has conclusively 
argued for the limit {Schranke) of categories within sensible uses (CPR, A146/B186), 
this very power of setting limit is itself a riddle yet to be solved. In the last chapter 
of the “Analytic，” i.e. right before going into the discussion of the transcendental 
ideas, Kant invited us to cast "another glance on the map" (CPR, A236/B295) of 
"the land of truth" (CPR, A235/B295). He found that concept of noumenon can 
serves as the limiting concept to both the power of sensibility and understanding. 
There he wrote: 
Now in this way^4 our understanding acquires a negative 
expansion. I.e., it is not limited by sensibility; rather it 
limits sensibility by calling things in themselves (things not 
regarded as appearances) noumena. But it immediately sets 
bounds for itself also: it acknowledges not cognizing things 
in themselves through any categories, and hence only 
thinking them under the name of an unknown something. 
(CPR, A256/B312) 
In order to understand the limiting function of noumenon, one should bear in mind 
that the power of understanding and its pure concepts, i.e. categories, could only 
have legitimate use for determining sensible intuition. As a result, the problematic 
assertion of the noumenon is a negative expansion {negative Erweiterung) of the 
understanding as we have no determined theoretical cognition to the noumenon. 
Understanding seems to have expanded its use beyond the sensible. One could 
inquire or even challenge how Kant could have, after limiting understanding to the 
imply a mere negative interpretation of the part of "Dialectic." 
Translator's note reads, ‘‘I.e. through the concept of a noumenon as used problematically." 
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use of determining the sensible intuition, asserted the above mentioned expansion. It 
has indeed been one of the long debated problems in the interpretation of Kant's first 
Critique?^ I think the key to this debate is to distinguish between the Kantian sense 
of the setting of limit (Schranke) and of bound (Grenze). The problem here is that 
this expansion (Erweiterung) of the understanding, which makes possible the limit 
setting, seemingly could not have its source in the power of understanding itself, as 
noumenon is never an object of cognition. The source of the power of this expansion 
then requires a power like that of reason, which is "neither locked inside the sensible 
world nor adrift outside it.，，(Proleg, 150，IV, 361) 
From the above formulation, we could summarize a few points. First, this limit 
setting of cognition and the power of thinking involves the concept of noumenon 
that cannot be an object of cognition, but only a thought entity. Secondly, as 
noumenon is not an object of cognition, any connection to that goes beyond the 
power of understanding. Finally, only the power of reason could be the source of this 
connection to the noumenon. The above points hinge on the argument that limit 
setting involves going beyond what is limited, i.e. the sensible world of appearance, 
which could not be achieved by understanding alone. Understanding proper could 
only assert negatively that something cannot be known, where that something serves 
as the limiting concept of experience. If Kant has conclusively argued for the 
limiting of the use of understanding to the realm of the sensible in the "Analytic," 
we should then investigate into why the limit setting of understanding to that of the 
sensible has not completed the task of a critique of reason. This question could be 
answered once we have explicated the task of bound setting of reason itself and 
25 See Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 237-254. Although I will not thematically discuss 
this problem, the major concern of my thesis, namely, the transition to the supersensible from the 
sensible, is theoretically related to the problem. It is hoped that my working on the issue of the 
emergence of and the transition towards the supersensible would eventually contribute to the 
discussion of the problem of noumenon. 
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shown the difference between a proper bound setting and a sensible limit setting 
done in the "Analytic." 
In the conclusion to the third part of Prolegomena, Kant pointed out the 
difference between a limit and a boundary. He wrote: 
Boundaries (Grenzen) (in extended things) always 
presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed 
location, and that enclosed that location; limits (Schranken) 
require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations that 
affect a magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute 
completeness. (Proleg, 142, IV, 352)26 
Limit to Kant is the mere negation which avoids one taking a progress as complete. 
He pointed out that in mathematics and natural science we recognize "limits but not 
boundaries." (Proleg, 142, IV, 352) Setting of limits to these sciences requires only 
one's acknowledgement of something beyond the domain of the science; however, it 
does not require any connection to that something. Hence, limit setting is a mere 
negation. Transcendental schematism limits the use of categories within that of the 
sensible, where that limit is set by analysing the condition for categories to have 
signification (CPR, A145-147/B185-187). It is shown through the analysis of the 
procedure of categories' application that non-sensible objects are beyond the limit of 
understanding. As a result, the limit is drawn by negating what is not-sensible and 
the limit is merely negative. 
However, the proper task of a critique of reason is setting bounds to reason's 
uses. The problematically presupposed concept of noumenon cannot fulfil this task, 
as it is a mere negative limiting concept.^^ The positive bound setting involves 
having connection to, if not cognition of, both sides of the bound. We understand 
26 Italics and the German words inserted are mine. 
27 See (Proleg, 144, IV’ 354). 
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clearly the space on the side of the sensible, where it is our domain of cognition; 
however, how and what connection do we have for the other side of the bound, i.e. 
something supersensible, becomes a problem. Kant formulated thus: 
For the question now arises: How does our reason relate to 
the connection of that with which we are acquainted to that 
with which we are not acquainted, and never will be? 
(Proleg, 144，IV, 354) 
Up to this point we have given a preliminary answer to the question why an 
investigation to the ideas of reason is of theoretical necessity. A critique of reason 
needs to explicate how reason could have connection to the supersensible and hence 
how reason could properly set bounds to itself, although that ability of reason also 
leads to transcendental illusion. Only upon this character of reason we could make 
sense of the talk of reason's “natural dialectic" (CPR, A669/B697)^l The part of 
"Dialectic" would be the critical step for showing that although the ideas of reason 
in their misemployment leads to illusions, however, how reason connects with the 
supersensible "must still be able to be determined and brought to clarity." (Proleg, 
144，IV，354) 
More importantly, this character of reason is indeed the condition of possibility 
of transcendental philosophy itself. If we could only limit our understanding through 
the analysis of the concepts of understanding, then a critique of reason would be 
superfluous as mathematics and natural sciences show very well the legitimate use 
of understanding within the sensible realm.^^ Even Hume the sceptic would not 
28 Italic is mine. 
29 However, Karl Ameriks pointed out that without a critical philosophy, it is easy to fall into 
scepticism or scientism, which would in the end deflate the meaning of many common human 
activities. See his Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical 
Philosophy, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 37-77. Nevertheless, 
Ameriks wanted to limit Kant's critical philosophy as a modest system, which is not any direct 
account against scepticism. I shall refer to this account of Ameriks in the last chapter of this thesis. 
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have argued against that limit of our power of understanding. However, 
transcendental philosophy requires that the bounds are set with necessity a priori. 
Sceptics like Hume do not deny the sensible limit of understanding; they only doubt 
whether this limit can be determined with necessity. They would like to think that 
this limit is set by the contingent fact that we happened to have lived in an empirical 
world; hence the limit is determined solely by our sensibility. However, for Kant 
these bounds of reason must be set according to the a priori principle of reason itself. 
These determinate bounds hence must be worked out not only from the side of 
sensible limit but also from reason's connection to the other side, i.e. the 
supersensible. Only upon that reason's use can be enclosed with certain fixed 
location (Proleg, 142, IV，352). 
The above discussion confirms the passage quoted earlier saying that 
noumenon does not only limit understanding, but also limits sensibility (CPR, 
A256/B312). Sensibility is limited in a sense that the givenness from it cannot be 
taken as unconditioned, meaning that it is necessary to allow a space for the 
supersensible elements. I shall discuss this point in the later discussion of the 
antinomy. The sensible limit to the use of understanding and the supersensible limit 
to the realm of the sensible fixed the proper bound of reason a priori. This bound 
determining character of reason is the first path that I would like to formulate as the 
explication of the emergence of the problematic of the supersensible. Reason's 
connection to the supersensible makes possible this bound setting, as Kant 
summarized thus: 
But setting the boundary to the field of experience through 
something that is otherwise unknown to it is indeed a 
cognition that is still left to reason from this standpoint, by 
which reason is neither locked inside the sensible nor adrift 
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outside it, but, as befits knowledge of a boundary, restricts 
itself solely to the relation of what lies outside the boundary 
to what is contained within. (Proleg, 150, IV，361) 
One can see that the bound setting character of reason is closely related to the task of 
and the condition of possibility of the critique of pure reason. Only if reason has 
certain connection to the supersensible, it is possible for a philosophical reflection of 
the uses and bounds of human cognitive power. Up to this point I have only argued 
for reason's connection to the supersensible from the structure of the task of critique 
of reason. It seems to be necessary for reason to have supersensible connection, as a 
critique of reason sets bound, instead of limit, to its own use. However, there are still 
several questions left opened. Firstly, why the bounds of reason can be and should 
be determined with a priori necessity? This question goes together with the question 
on why bounds are desired in this philosophical reflection of human power of 
thinking instead of limits. There is indeed no problem with the limits of thinking 
determined by mathematics and natural sciences and a bound determination would 
be superfluous if there were not any further ends. Moreover, if only limits were 
sufficient for the above mentioned philosophical reflection, then it would be likely 
for us to accept the empiricist thesis and to become sceptical of "reason's connection 
to the supersensible," for which in a strict sense means “having no reason at all." 
Upon the emergence of all these questions, I think it is now a proper time for us to 
look at how Kant gives accounts to them by means of the theoretical device of 
antinomy. 
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Antinomy and the Supersensible Totality 
From the above discussion I have argued that in order to render possible a 
transcendental philosophy, it is necessary for human power of cognition to have 
connection to the supersensible ideas. Transcendental philosophy, as a self critique 
of reason, sets bounds to reason's uses by the power of reason itself. As 
mentioned above, we need to inquire into how Kant justifies the necessity of 
reason's bounds determination and why the task must be accomplished from the 
standpoint of reason. One way of arguing for the above theses, beyond the structural 
consideration of transcendental philosophy itself, would be from Kant's doctrine of 
antinomy. 
As mentioned above, by setting bounds to theoretical cognition, both the 
powers of understanding and of sensibility are limited. What is important here for 
our discussion of antinomy would be the limit to sensibility. Through limiting the 
givenness to our theoretical cognition to that of the sensible, a realm of 
supersensible is thus determined (although never theoretically cognised). The bound, 
as determined with fixed location, prevents us from taking what is sensibly given as 
given in themselves {an sich gegeben) (CPR, A492/B521). This transcendental 
differentiation between what is appearance as object of cognition and what is in 
itself and hence not cognizable is the basic thesis of Kant's transcendental idealism 
(CPR, A490/B518-A497/B525). With the doctrine of antinomy, Kant shows us that 
if the above distinction was not upheld, reason would contradict itself. 
Reason with its ideas directs the power of understanding upon determining 
experience with the view of totality (CPR, A321/B378). It is shown by an analysis of 
the logical use of reason in drawing inference {Vernunftschlufi). With its aim of 
30 This point I benefit from my supervisor Prof. Tze-wan Kwan, who upon teaching the philosophy 
of Kant stresses on the reflexive genitive (genitivus reflexivus) grammatical structure of the "of (der)” 
in the title of the Critique of Pure Reason {Kritik der reinen Vemunft). 
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reducing the manifold cognition to the smallest number of principles as universal 
conditions and hence obtaining unity (CPR, A305/B361), reason has totality in its 
view. Only with the view of totality, where all parts are considered according to the 
principles of the whole, and vice versa, can a unity of human cognitions be obtained. 
The above procedure of reason, in its formal use, is that of logical syllogism (CPR, 
A304/B360). 
Reason as a faculty of thinking in general, when having the totality in view, has 
its concepts, which are entitled transcendental ideas (CPR, A311/B368). The ideas of 
reason are the concepts of "the totality of conditions for a given conditioned" (CPR, 
A322/B379). Kant told us that "solely the unconditioned makes possible the totality 
of conditions" (ibid.), hence the ideas of reason are concepts of the unconditioned 
containing "a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned" {ibid.). Now this search of 
the unconditioned as synthesis, just like that of judgment, can be understood as 
having three kinds: 
first, of the categorical synthesis in a subject; second, of 
the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; third, 
of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system. (CPR, 
A323/B379) 
The antinomy of reason is analogous to the hypothetical synthesis (CPR, 
A406/B433). It seeks to arrive at the unconditioned totality of the synthesis of 
appearance. Our theoretical cognitions are always conditioned by the temporal and 
spatial characters of our intuition, and also by the discursivity of our understanding. 
All synthesis of our appearance hinges on the temporal and spatial structure of 
givenness from intuition and discursive structure of understanding. However, here 
reason demands that the unconditioned as the basic of the synthesis must be given as 
well. He formulated thus: 
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Reason demands this totality according to the principle that 
if the conditioned is given, then the entire sum of conditions 
and hence the absolutely unconditioned (through which 
alone the conditioned was possible) is also given. (CPR, 
A409/B436) 
This demand of reason of the unconditioned out of the synthesis of appearance gives 
rise to the antinomy. Kant told us that the clue to the solution of the antinomy is 
transcendental idealism, i.e. the transcendental differentiation between the sensibly 
appearance and the supersensible thing in itself. It is because the contradictions of 
reason arise once “we take the principle of their connection to be principles that are 
universally valid for things in themselves and not merely for experience" (Proleg, 
130, IV，339f.). In other words, if the realm of the sensible was not bounded, and we 
were then allowed to expand it unconditionally, then we would find ourselves 
contradictory upon the expansion of the appearance to the unconditioned. We would 
take what is unconditioned, which serves as the basis of the conditions, as having 
the same status as what is sensible, which is itself conditioned. As a result, it is 
critically important for a philosophical reflection of the human power of thinking to 
distinguish between the supersensible and the sensible with transcendental bounds, 
as mere limits from the side of the sensible make no fixed location and leave 
possibility of illusive expansion. We now see that the task of critique of reason, 
where bounds are set, is to make sure that reason does not contradict itself, and the 
contradictions are exposed by the theoretical device of antinomy. 
Kant tried to explicate the self contradictions of reason upon confusing the 
31 I shall in the following explicate the contradictions resulted through an analysis of the antinomies. 
32 Mathematics and natural sciences, as Kant mentions, recognize "limits but not boundaries" (Proleg, 
142，IV，352); because they have possibly infinite expansion of insight, yet, they have not “continuous 
advancement towards other sciences" {ibid.). This is not the case for metaphysics, as reason finds no 
satisfaction in the sensible world (ibid., 143，IV，353f.). 
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sensible with the supersensible through an investigation of cosmology, a branch of 
traditional metaphysics. He assigned the four cosmological ideas into two groups, 
namely, the mathematical and the dynamical (CPR, A418f./B446); and the four 
ideas are as following: 
1. Absolute completeness of the composition of the given 
whole of all appearances： 
2. Absolute completeness of the division of a given whole 
in [the realm ofj appearance; 
3. Absolute completeness of the arising of an 
appearance as such; 
4. Absolute completeness of the dependence of the 
existence of the changeable in [the realm ofj 
appearance. (CPR, A415/B443) 
I will in the following discuss briefly how the contradictions of reason arise from 
these cosmological ideas. 
In the first antinomy, both the thesis and the antithesis concerning the limit of 
space and time are asserted. The thesis claims that "the world has beginning in time 
and is also enclosed within bounds as regards space" (CPR, A426/B454); the 
antithesis claims that "the world has no beginning and no bounds in space, but is 
infinite as regards both time and space" {ibid.). What is antithetic here can be put in 
the following way. Take the explication of the conflict concerning time as an 
example, if time has no beginning, then at every given point of time an infinite time 
has gone by; however, by definition infinity cannot be completed at any given 
moment. Having an infinite time passed at a given moment contradicts the definition 
of infinity; and the antithesis hinges on the definition that at any given moment there 
has been an infinite time gone by. This circular definition of infinity of time reveals 
that there has to be a beginning of time. However, on the other hand, if time has a 
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beginning, then before time begins there must be an "empty time，，{ibid.\ or simply 
be no time at all. Without the form of time, nothing can possibly begin, as we lack a 
correlate to distinguish between the states of being and not-being. Hence, from this 
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side of argument, we can see that the world must be infinite regards time. From 
the above we see that both the thesis and the antithesis could be argued evidently 
from itself，yet, they contradict each other. Kant told us that with two mutually 
contradictory propositions "the concept underlying them both is itself contradictory" 
(Proleg, 132, IV’ 341). The underlying contradictory conception of the antinomy is 
the confusion of the unconditioned with the conditioned, where they are thought to 
be having the same status and can be equally cognized theoretically. The 
unconditioned here is the idea of the world-whole^ which I shall explain in the 
following. 
There is theoretical reason for Kant to attribute these ideas of reason as 
cosmological, i.e. as related to the world. These ideas indeed refer to the 
world-whole, which can never be given in intuition (CPR, A518f./546f.). The ideas 
of the cosmic whole are indeterminate, meaning that whether the world has limits 
regarding space and time cannot be cognized from the theoretical perspective. Hence, 
he pointed out thus: 
Hence only appearances in the world are conditionally 
bounded, but the world itself is bounded neither in a 
conditioned nor in an unconditioned way. (CPR, 
A522/B550) 
The unconditioned totality of the cosmic syntheses of appearance cannot be known 
and hence both the theses and the antitheses cannot possibly be refuted by 
This should serve as an example to the other mathematical antinomies in the first Critique, as they 
should have similar structures in arguments. As a result, I should leave the interpretation of the other 
arguments in the first two antinomies behind. 
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experience (Proleg, 131, IV，340). The regress to the unconditioned is a regressus in 
indefinitum (CPR, A520/B548). This concept of totality as indefinitum is not given 
in intuition. Upon taking what is unconditioned and not given as the same as 
sensibly conditioned, reason contradicts itself. As a result, in order to avoid the self 
contradiction of reason, the transcendental differentiation between the sensibly 
conditioned appearance, as theoretically cognizable, and the supersensible 
unconditioned totality must be upheld. We can never have theoretical cognition to 
the supersensible unconditioned totality, although that totality somehow serves as a 
regulative principle to the synthesis of appearance?* 
However, if what is supersensible and unconditioned is not theoretical 
cognition, and if we are left only with the sensible, then several problems emerge. 
First, the problem of metaphysical disposition, which, as Kant has mentioned, is 
natural to reason (CPR, A10/B21; Proleg, 150f., IV，362) has to be answered. Is it 
merely an illusive character of reason? If so, could reason possibly tolerate such a 
fault? Under this circumstance should we not discard reason entirely? Moreover, if 
reason on the other hand has its use for the general power of inference, it is not after 
all an entirely faulty power of mind. Kant came to tell us that reason's ideas can 
serve as regulative principles of human cognition. That may imply a necessity of the 
unconditioned totality to cognition, although we can never have cognition to that 
totality from a theoretical perspective. Another important point is that if we discard 
reason entirely and limit human cognition as such to the sensible only, then bounds 
cannot be set transcendentally, as human beings lack any connection to the 
supersensible. Without a proper bound determination reason easily wanders off the 
shore to the sea of supersensible and takes what is theoretically impossible for 
34 I will discuss the role of unconditioned totality as regulative principle of experience in the later 
part of this chapter. 
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cognition as real knowledge. As a result, reason here has the ability to solve the 
riddle from its own womb (CPR, B23); yet this very ability (its connection to the 
supersensible) is the ground of its illusion. It is no doubt that Kant dismisses 
theoretical cognition to the supersensible in full-blown sense. Yet, at least in the 
"Antinomy," Kant leaves another realm of human activity opened for reason's 
connection to the supersensible, namely, that of the practical. This supersensible 
unconditioned must eventually be able to be presupposed outside the series of 
sensible conditions, or else reason would remain contradictory within itself as it 
naturally demands the unconditioned (CPR, A564/B592). Although the 
unconditioned totality in the end serves as a regulative principle of reason, however, 
it can only be assumed problematically and negatively, as it can never become 
objects of cognition itself. The positive emergence of the supersensible, through an 
analysis from the theoretical activity to the practical activity, can be seen from his 
analysis of the dynamical antinomies. 
Kant told us that the structure of the two dynamical antinomies is different from 
that of the mathematical antinomies.^^ As in the mathematical principles of pure 
For the distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical principle of experience, one 
should not overlook an important footnote provided by Kant in (CPR, A162/B201). There he 
mentioned that "all [linking or] combination {coniunctio) is either assembly (compositio) or 
connection (nexus)" (ibid.). Combination refers to synthesis in general, which is a condition of 
possibility of human cognition, as all our experiences are synthetic in nature. Assembly refers to the 
mathematical synthesis of understanding, which conforms to the mathematical categories and 
concerns the constitution of our intuition. Mathematical categories are rules for constituting cognition 
as such. Kant thinks that our cognitions are determined numerically upon constitution {ibid., 
A178/B221); hence they are with extensive and intensive magnitude and mathematically synthesized. 
As rules of understanding, they teach us how an intuition can be generated (ibid), hence they concern 
with the constitution of our empirical intuition. 
Connection, on the other hand, refers to the dynamical synthesis of understanding, which 
conforms to the dynamical categories and concerns the existence of our experience. Dynamical 
categories are rules for regulating the objects of our intuitions. They concern merely with the 
existence of the objects and their relation to one another {ibid., A178/B220). They do not serve as 
rules instructing the constitution of cognition, but only regulate them in modes of time. Kant's 
discussion on the distinction between analogy of mathematics and that of philosophy exemplifies the 
difference between the two kinds of principle nicely, Kant pointed out that mathematical analogies 
"express the equality of two quantitative relations, and are always constitutive.’ so that if three 
members of the proportion are given, the fourth is likewise given, that is, can be constructed" (ibid., 
A179/B222). From such kind of analogy we can know how the next member of the set will be 
produced. However, analogies of philosophy give only qualitative relations (ibid), which means 
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understanding, the mathematical antinomies concern only the sensible conditions 
and their unconditioned basis. It is in this sense that both the mathematical principles 
and the mathematical antinomies concern the homogeneous synthesis of appearance. 
However, it is not the case with the dynamical principles and antinomy. Whereas it 
is difficult to see how the unconditioned can be saved in the mathematical 
antinomies, "an entirely new outlook" (CPR, A529/B557) is provided from the 
dynamical antinomies. As dynamical principle and antinomy concern the 
heterogeneous synthesis of appearance, rooms are made for something not 
belonging to the constitution of the synthesis itself as an unconditioned. To put it in 
other words, in mathematical synthesis of appearance, we concern ourselves only 
with how objects are spatially and temporally constituted. They are entirely sensible 
conditions that we are concerned and nothing beyond. However, in dynamical 
synthesis, we are concerned with the existence (CPR, A160/B199) of objects, instead 
of the constitution of an object. The condition that makes possible the connection 
{nexus) of appearance can be itself heterogeneous to that of the sensible conditions 
(space/time) and hence be ''merely intelligible” (CPR, A531/B559). As a result, both 
the conditioned and the unconditioned can be asserted without real contradiction.^^ 
Now the problem remains that in what sense the unconditioned can be asserted, if 
not as theoretical cognition. 
At the moment we shall first take a brief look at the structure of the dynamical 
"from three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge only of the relation to a fourth, not of 
the fourth member itself {ibid., A180f./B222). As a result, from this kind of analogy we can merely 
know in what relation the next member of the set will be given. Such distinction of analogies also 
apply to postulates of empirical thought in general, hence the categories of modality are also merely 
regulative. Connection, as mentioned above, is the synthesis of understanding conforming to the rules 
of the dynamical categories. 
36 Kant told us that in dynamical regress of conditions we are not concerned with "the possibility of 
an unconditioned whole composed from given parts, or the possibility of an unconditioned part for a 
given whole” (CPR, A560/B588). These, as from the mathematical regress, must be themselves 
regarded as a part of the series. However, dynamical regress concerns "with the derivation of a state 
from its cause, or the derivation of the contingent existence of substance itself from necessary 
existence" {ibid.). They are not necessary part of the empirical series of synthesis. 
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antinomies. The thesis of the third antinomy claims that in order to explain the laws 
of nature as causality, a causality through freedom must be assumed (CPR, 
A444/B472). On the other hand, the antithesis claims that freedom is contradictory 
to laws of nature (CPR, A445/B473). To put in simple words, the antithesis argues 
through stating that freedom is no causality at all and that nothing in nature is not 
determined by laws of nature. The strategy of the thesis is by appealing to the 
conception of causality itself. By the conception of causality, an effect must be 
sufficiently determined by a cause. If everything in nature is caused by another cause, 
then in the end nothing is not an effect of another cause. It seems that the above 
proposition has no problem at all, as everything is sufficiently determined by their 
causes. However, when we think more deeply about it, our assertion of "everything" 
itself leads to a hidden contradiction. When we speak about "everything in nature," 
we take nature as a whole ; the problem remains whether this "nature as whole" is 
itself something. If it is itself something, then it should be determined sufficiently 
from another cause. If the whole itself is not nature itself, then the universal laws of 
nature do not apply to the whole. We have already seen in the first antinomy that 
totality cannot be an object of cognition; hence whether it is itself nature or not we 
cannot possibly decide. Nevertheless, if we take nature as a whole as not-nature, 
then it is possible that it can have a causality of freedom. On the other hand, if we 
take nature as a whole as something, hence as nature, then the whole should also be 
caused by another cause, or else the conception of causality cannot be upheld. We 
immediately see that this conception of causality cannot be upheld with "unlimited 
universality，’ (CPR, A446/B474), as if what is itself the cause of the nature as whole 
is itself caused, then it would become a part of nature and still another cause is 
“ S e e Clark Zumbach, "A Note on the Thesis Argument of the Third Antinomy" Ratio XXIII 2 
(1981): 114-123. He stresses on the importance of interpreting the nature Kant mentioned as a whole, 
which Kant offered as an argument for the thesis of the third antinomy. 
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needed. As a result, this something which is the cause of nature as a whole, goes 
beyond what is nature; and it is not only possible that it can have a causality of 
freedom, as mentioned above, but it necessarily has to be itself free, as an “absolute 
spontaneity” (ibid.). 
This transcendental freedom, as an unconditioned totality, cannot be cognized 
theoretically. Kant has not hesitated upon telling us that both freedom and necessary 
being are not possible objects of cognition. However, as dynamical regresses, these 
two cosmological questions opened up a prospect of the human supersensible. 
Through distinguishing between mathematical and dynamical principle of thought, it 
is shown that the ideas of totality referring to the two mathematical antinomies are 
absolutely impossible. They could only be a presupposition of reason for its 
regulation to understanding. Whereas for the ideas of dynamical antinomies, 
freedom and necessity are both possible as they do not really contradict the sensible 
nature. They are heterogeneous conditions to that of the sensible condition and 
belong not in the series of sensible conditions (CPR, A530/B558). What is important 
here is to distinguish, again, between the sensible conditioned as nature and the 
supersensible unconditioned as freedom. This transcendental differentiation, beyond 
having a merely negative sense (of dismissing the supersensible), as Allison thought, 
provides "a space or 'transcendental location' for the Idea in the noumenal realm and, 
at the same time, allowing for the possibility of considering one and the same event 
from two points of view." It invites us to look beyond the realm of sensible, 
theoretically cognizable nature for what reason demands and finds true satisfaction 
(Proleg, 141, IV, 351). We, as human beings, do not merely cognize. We all also act 
38 Henry E. Allison, "Practical and Transcendental Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason" 
Kant-Studien 73 (1982): 281. Moreover, see (PE, 383，XX，294), where Kant explicitly pointed out 
that there are two viewpoints, namely the theoretico-dogmatic and the practico-dogmatic, and a 
theory of the supersensible as an object of reason can only be framed from the latter point of view. 
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Upon the world as nature. After analyzing the concept of human practice, Kant 
found that the human activity of practice is where our connection to the 
supersensible lies. Only upon having a real connection to the supersensible, could 
Kant's transcendental differentiation between appearance and thing-in-itself make 
any real sense. The reason is that if we only have insight to the sensibly conditioned 
appearance, then it definitely make no sense to claim that there is something we 
know-not-what as noumenon. Moreover, if the supersensible could only be 
presupposed problematically^ no matter as limiting concept or as regulative principle, 
Kant cannot possibly defend reason in face of the sceptics. Any critique of reason, as 
transcendental philosophy, would be as well impossible; as I have argued that the 
bound determining characteristic of critical philosophy requires reason's connection 
to the supersensible. As a result, I shall in the following section expound how Kant 
gives objective reality to the supersensible through a critique of practical reason. 
Concluding remarks 
I have in this section argued that the task of a critique of reason itself requires 
reason's connection to the supersensible, as the structure of a critique is actually an 
activity of bound determination. I also have argued that reason upon self-criticism 
must have supersensible connection by means of an analysis of the contrast between 
the concept of “limit” and that of "bound." Moreover, I have argued through an 
analysis of the antinomy that this bound determination is necessary, for if no fixed 
bound can be set by reason itself, reason would contradict itself through a confusion 
of the sensible with the supersensible. From all these we can see that there must be 
certain supersensible elements in our cognition, although they are not themselves 
possible objects of cognition; empiricism taken to unlimited universality would be 
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contradictory for a philosophical point of view, as such a stand makes no room for 
reason, and without reason, philosophical reflection of human activities would deem 
impossible. The problem now remains, what is the status of the supersensible 
elements in cognition. According to the standard view of Kant on the condition of 
possibility of cognition, sensible intuition is necessary for a legitimate cognition. 
However, the above mentioned supersensible elements cannot be an object of 
cognition, as they lack givenness as sensible intuition of any kind. This conclusion 
follows from the analysis of the antinomy, as those supersensible elements cannot be 
taken as their sensible counterpart. In the theoretical part of transcendental 
philosophy, these necessary supersensible elements could only be presupposed 
problematically. Such a presupposition would in the end treat the possibility of 
transcendental philosophy itself. As a result, it is of critical necessity for Kant to 
give an account to this problem. A clue for solving this problem lies in the practical 
aspect of human activity, which I shall explicate in the next section. 
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IV. The Supersensible in the second Critique: Reality of Freedom as Practical 
Reason 
The moral philosophy of Kant has been one of the most studied issues in the history 
of philosophy. Numerous of monographs and journals on Kant's philosophy of 
morality have published, and will continue publishing. I intend here not to discuss in 
detail his moral philosophy, or more precisely, his practical philosophy. The reason 
is that a detailed discussion of his moral philosophy, especially focusing on its 
implication to morality in general, requires coverage of numerous of past studies. 
Whereas it is certain that moral philosophy of Kant is not the major theme of this 
thesis; I shall limit myself to the task of explicating how the critique of practical 
reason could eventually give objective reality to the supersensible. 
From the above one might think that I implied a difference between practical 
philosophy and moral philosophy. I think that it is indeed true from a Kantian 
perspective. My basic stance to this problem is that Kant has thematized morality for 
the sake of revealing genuine human practice. Only upon revealing genuine human 
practice, which is freedom in accordance with human volition, could he show how 
human practice has connection to the supersensible and then establish (CPrR, 6, V, 3) 
the objective reality of freedom. Or put it in another way, upon analysing human 
practice and trying to formulate one that is genuine, Kant found that moral practice 
is the only candidate for practice in strictest sense.^^ As a result, I propose that we 
39 One should notice that in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant started the "Analytic" with an 
explication of the practical principles in general, which are "propositions that contain a general 
determination of the will" (CPrR, 29, IV, 19). As general determination of the will, a practical 
principle is not from the start identical to moral principle. Only after Kant has explicated how pure 
reason itself can be practical and making a positive sense of freedom {ibid., 49，IV，33), does pure 
practical principle equates moral law. If one read closely the "Analytic" of principles of the second 
Critique, one finds that it is not until the "Comment" to the two "Problems" (ibid., 42, IV, 28f.) did 
Kant mention "moral law" (ibid., 43，IV，29). This finding should evidently support my argument that 
Kant did not in a theoretical sense start with morality in his second Critique and instead he started 
with practice in general. I am not here trying to guess whether Kant has moral law intended upon the 
writing of the second Critique, however, theoretically speaking he derived freedom through an 
analysis of human practice in general and finally came up with the idea that moral law makes us 
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can take "Kantianism" in moral philosophy as an implication of his practical 
philosophy, and that his discussion of human practice as a theoretical strategy for 
asserting the supersensible, which in the end could ground his critical system of pure 
40 reason. 
"Keystone “ of the critical system 
Dieter Henrich in his various studies showed us that morality had not been a major 
philosophical theme to Kant from the start. He told us that Kant had gone through 
considerable changes of thought about morality and it is only upon the writing of 
Critique of Practical Reason that Kant had made clear to himself the meaning and 
status of human moral practice.*! It is well known that Kant's reading of Rousseau 
was an important influence to his change of view on morality; Henrich has even 
found a note by Kant said: 
I am a scientist by inclination. I know the thirst for 
knowledge and the deep satisfaction of every advance of 
knowledge. There was a time when I believed all this 
knowledge could be the honor of mankind and I despised 
all those who were bereft of such knowledge. Rousseau has 
conscious of our freedom {ibid., 43f.，IV，29f.). As a result, I do believe that what we nowadays called 
"Kantian morality" or "Kantianism" in contemporary moral philosophy is implication of Kantian 
practical philosophy, i.e. how Kant understood human practice. I hope that this distinction between 
practical philosophy and Kantian morality could spare me the burden of a detailed discussion, or 
even a defence, of his moral philosophy. For a systematic demarcation of the powers of human mind 
in relation to practice, see (MM, 373-376, VI，211-214). 
4° It is obvious that in the late thought of Kant, moral and political issues have gained more and more 
weight, and it is undeniable that Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals and Metaphysics of Morals 
are two treatises contributed to moral philosophy with clear themes. However, I thii^ I could argue 
conclusively, from above (together with the footnote 38), that Kant's turn to practical philosophy 
(with the writing of the second Critique) is with a specific theoretical aim within his critical system of 
pure reason. See also Dieter Henrich, “The Deduction of the Moral Law: The Reasons for the 
Obscurity of the Final Section of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" In Kant's 
Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals; Critical Essays, Paul Guyer ed.，(Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998)，where he discussed the difference between the task of Groundwork 
and the second Critique. 
41 See Henrich, Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World, p. 6 and “The Deduction of 
the Moral Law: The Reasons for the Obscurity of the Final Section of Kant's Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals’�. 
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corrected me. I learned to honor man, and I would consider 
myself less worthy than the average worker if I did not 
believe that all this [meaning "philosophy"] could 
contribute to what really matters一the restoration of the 
rights of mankind.42 
It is clear that Kant occupied himself with philosophy of theoretical cognition from 
the start. He concerns himself with the a priori principles of cognition, which in the 
end would put sciences and mathematics on a solid ground. There are two reasons 
for Kant to have re-oriented himself and turned to an investigation of human 
practice. As a historical reason, Kant's reading of Rousseau made him understood 
more about the meaning of knowledge with reference to human life. It is evident that 
when he talked about the "restoration of rights of mankind," he certainly has human 
morality in his mind. However, there is yet another theoretical reason for this turn. 
Kant explicitly mentioned the importance of revealing the reality of freedom 
through practice in order to ground the system of pure reason. I take him to mean so 
when he wrote: 
Now the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved 
by an apodeictic law of practical reason, forms the keystone 
of the whole edifice of a system of pure reason, even of 
speculative reason. (CPrR, 5, IV, 3f.) 
From this passage we can see that the above mentioned connection to the 
supersensible, as only problematically assumed for theoretical reason, can be proved 
real and positive only through freedom. This involves a change of view, as the 
‘‘keystone” of the system cannot be settled from a theoretical part of philosophy 
42 Immanuel Kant, "Bemerkungen zu den Beobactungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und 
Erhabenen" (1764), in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. XX, Koniglich Preussische Akademie ed., 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1942), pp. 44-45; as quoted by Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 
p. 55. 
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itself. It is our structure of theoretical cognition that limits our cognition to only that 
of the sensibly conditioned. However, this very structure of cognition, where reason 
has its place, can only be grounded with elements beyond this structure; and that 
element beyond is the supersensible substrate of humanity he later mentioned in the 
third CritiqueThe concept of freedom can never give any object of cognition, yet 
its reality is certain as a “fact of reason" (CPrR, 46，IV, 31). Only upon showing the 
reality of connection to the supersensible as freedom, reason can be asserted with 
certainty and the possibility of transcendental philosophy can be saved. It is in this 
sense that freedom is a “keystone” to the system of reason; indeed, Kant in the first 
Critique has already mentioned that reason must depend on freedom for its existence 
(CPR，A738/B766).“ 
Pure practical reason and freedom 
As I will not discuss in details Kant's practical philosophy, I shall only in the 
following give a brief account of his analysis of practice and its relation to the 
supersensible. 
From the above analysis of the antinomies, we can see that the idea of freedom 
is the only possible connection of reason to the supersensible. However, freedom 
cannot be cognized theoretically, but only be realized practically. As a result, a 
critique of practical reason would be a task to establish transcendental freedom 
(CPrR, 4’ IV’ 3); this task would mean proving reason itself as being practical {ibid.) 
Kant started the critique with an analysis of practical principle, i.e. a proposition that 
43 Kant actually pointed out that "practical pure reason must necessarily start from principles, which 
must therefore be laid at the basis of all sciences as the first data, and cannot first arise from science" 
(CPrR, 117，IV, 91). Also see the two viewpoints doctrine in (PE, 383, XX’ 294), see the above note 
37 of this chapter. 
^ There Kant told us that reason shows its freedom in its free subjection of itself to criticism. Now 
we can see it is the essential characteristic of reason to have the ability of self criticism and that 
ability hinges on freedom. 
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"contain a general determination of the will" {ibid., 29, IV，19). Will, as a faculty of 
desire (MM, 375，VI, 213), presupposes objects as its determining basis (CPrR，32, 
IV, 21). For instance, in hunger I have this object of a loaf of bread as what I desire, 
as a goal which determines my corresponding action. The practical principle is 
determined by this object, and has a content of the possible actions as means to 
obtain the loaf. This is what Kant called material principle of the will {ibid., 34, IV’ 
22). Actions in accordance with material practical principle are not free, as its 
determining basis is in the object desired. A material practical principle would be a 
mere maxim {ibid., 29，IV’ 19). It means that it would only be determined by specific 
goal at specific moment with a specify standpoint. The determining basis in material 
principles, to put in a famous Kantian term, is from inclination. 
If a materially determined action is not free because it is determined by 
inclination, then does it mean that freedom lies in the actions which are free of 
inclination? For one thing, inclination does not conceptually exclude freedom. What 
matters here is the determining basis. I could freely choose to have a dish of nachos 
instead of a loaf of bread in hunger, yet, the determining bases of the action of 
getting hold of a dish of nachos and eating it are my hunger and my fancy to nachos. 
I am still in this case having a certain sense of freedom, if one would like to admit 
that taste for food is free. If we are to define a genuine freedom merely by calling it 
a choice not determined by inclination, it is only a concept of freedom in negative 
sense (CPrR, 49, IV，33). The problem of having only a negative sense of freedom is 
that we can imagine a person having an action, which is disinclined, yet lacking any 
determining basis. It would be an action done by arbitrariness. Worse would be the 
case if the action is done by mental illness, for example, when a mentally ill 
physically hurt oneself. We could say that in both cases, the actions are free, to an 
extent that it lacks any basis. We would than say that it is done arbitrarily or 
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irrationally. If freedom equates arbitrariness or madness, then the choice made 
would be indeed indeterminate, and it would be suicidal for reason to claim it has 
any connection to this kind of freedom. A negative sense of freedom, hence, would 
not be a desirable supersensible idea for grounding a system of pure reason and 
would not prove that reason is itself practical. 
If the determining basis of the will is not inclination, and yet it is not arbitrary 
or irrational, then nothing is left for a basis but "the mere form of a universal 
legislation" (CPrR, 40，IV，27). This form of legislation is not at all mysterious, if we 
reflect on the meaning of a principle. Although a material practical principle is not 
universal, as it is determined by specific object of desired, as a principle, it should 
yet has certain prescriptive power. It is right for me to buy the loaf of bread at the 
bakery, and it is wrong for me to bake it myself (with the condition of me knowing 
nothing about bakery). This telling of right/wrong is the general power of 
prescription/^ and this power is the essence of principle. As a result, although the 
decision of getting a loaf of bread is determined by my hunger, the practical 
principle telling me to go to the bakery instead of baking the bread has a certain 
form of lawfulness. A principle being lawful and having prescriptive power should 
have a form of legislation. 
This power of telling right/wrong is a power of reason, as in practical sphere, 
reason “prescribes action as a means to an effect that is the aim" (CPrR, 30, IV, 20). 
Reason calculates by which means it is the most rational way of achieving the aim. 
Abstracted from material objects as determining basis, the mere form of legislation 
is universal, as it is the basic structure of reason's activity of telling right/wrong. 
However, as human will is not a pure will {Wille\ which has reason as its sole 
45 Henrich told us that freedom is the origin of lawfulness as such, i.e. "laws that distinguish right 
from wrong;" See Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, p. 57. 
Chapter One 42 
determining basis, but is also determined by inclination, the legislative form of pure 
reason "necessitates" (notigt, CPrR, 31, IV, 20) an action as an imperative {ibid.). 
From this structure of practice, we can see that if there is a positive concept of 
freedom, it will have its determining basis in reason itself, as a power of telling 
right/wrong. The human will, as a faculty of desire, will only be free positively when 
it has its determining basis in the legislative form of reason. This sufficiency in 
reason's determination of the will, which would prove reason as itself practical, is 
called autonomy (CPrR, 48，IV，33), and Kant found that among all human activities, 
morality has the autonomy of the will as its sole principle. This can actually be 
proved through an analysis of the concept of duty (as done in the Groundwork): 
But that the above principle of autonomy is the sole 
principle of morals can well be shown by mere analysis of 
the concepts of morality. (GW, 89，IV, 440) 
The analysis of the concept of duty I shall leave aside here.46 Now it is clear that 
why Kant has to thematize moral practice in order to ground the supersensible 
freedom with reality. It is only through the recognition of moral law, as a fact of 
reason, that the supersensible freedom is first revealed to us (CPrR, 44，IV, 30). 
Moreover, it is as well important that freedom is determinable (ibid., 43, IV, 29) in 
reason's own legislation. This means reason can sufficiently determine the will and 
hence is itself practical; and this renders reason's real connection to the 
supersensible. Reason now gains an objective reality of being the source of 
lawfulness itself. The ideas of totality, unconditioned, and intelligible, which are 
46 This work has been done primarily in the Groundwork. Kant made a distinction between analytic 
method and synthetic method, where critique of reason is synthetic and works of the other kinds are 
analytic. He claims that a mere analysis of the concept of duty cannot prove freedom and autonomy 
of the will (GW, 89，IV，440). Only a critique of pure practical reason, which is synthetic in method, 
could properly establish freedom as principle of reason. For a detailed discussion see (Proleg, 70, IV’ 
274f.). This distinction would further support my concentration on the interpretation of the text of 
second Critique while leaving aside Groundwork. 
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unknown from the perspective of theoretical cognition, now gain their signification 
and determination with reference to human practice {ibid., 76, IV, 56). Genuine 
practice (now as morality) is unconditioned {ibid., 45，IV, 31), as it goes beyond the 
empirical conditions and command with an ought. This unconditioned imperative is 
the “supreme condition of all maxims” {ibid.). In order for the moral law to have a 
universal significance, reason has to consider an action with a perspective of 
totalityHence, it is only through pure human practice as morality that the reality 
of the problematically assumed supersensible can be positively asserted (CPrR, 7, IV, 
5). 
After rendering the objective reality of freedom and hence settled his critical 
enterprise on the keystone, Kant now faces another systematic problem. Indeed, it is 
the notorious problem of the tension between the two Critiques. Before closing this 
chapter and moving forward to see how the analysis of the power of judgement 
relates to this problem, I shall briefly formulate the tension between the two 
Critiques in the last section of this chapter. 
47 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, p. 58. 
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V. Tension between the Two Critiques 
To summarize again what has been done, we can see that Kant started his critical 
philosophical reflection from a critique of pure reason. A critique of reason, which 
means a self-criticism of reason, involves a task of bounds setting to different uses 
of different powers. The possibility of this bound setting rests on reason's 
connection beyond what is sensibly given. From the theoretical cognitive 
perspective, the supersensible beyond the sensible cannot be cognized. However, the 
reality of the supersensible is established with a critique of practical reason, where 
reason is proved to be a sufficient determining basis of human will in action. 
Not only is that it is important for reason to have real connection to the 
supersensible, moreover, if the problem of transcendental freedom was not solved, 
reason would contradict with itself. From the above analysis of the dynamical 
antinomies we can see that the causality of nature, which arises from pure 
understanding, cannot be upheld with unlimited universality. It is shown in the third 
antinomy that reason would contradict itself with the definition of causality if the 
laws of nature are to be applied to everything, even to nature as a whole. Hence, the 
concept of transcendental freedom, as a causa noumenon (CPrR, 75, IV, 55), is 
indeed assumed. After all, Kant has told us that the origin of the concept of a cause 
is indeed from pure understanding, which is "independent of all sensible conditions 
and therefore not by itself restricted to phenomena (unless one wanted to make a 
theoretical determinate use of it)" {ibid.). A solution to the Humean scepticism 
induced by empiricism (CPrR, 70-76, IV’ 50-56) lies in the establishment of 
transcendental freedom, through a critique of practical reason. It is because the 
contradiction of reason with itself upon the assertion of the concept of causality is 
avoided. It is in this sense that practical reason is authorized to expand its use 
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beyond the sensible nature {ibid., 77，IV, 57) and that it has a primacy (ibid., 154，IV, 
121) over theoretical reason, as it is only through practical reason that the 
self-contradiction of reason could be solved and the status of reason in human 
faculties of mind be restored. 
It is also now appropriate to discuss briefly the third path to the supersensible I 
mentioned earlier (in the beginning of section III), namely the regulative function of 
the ideas of reason. The regulative function of reason, in its first sense, can be 
understood with reference to the cosmological ideas. Reason has a principle of the 
greatest possible continuation and expansion of experience (Grundsatz der 
grdfitmdglichen Fortsetzung und Enveiterung der Erfahrung) (CPR, A509/B537). 
As a regulative principle it 
commands us to perform, in the series of conditions of 
given appearances, a regression that is never permitted to 
stop at anything absolutely unconditioned. (CPR, 
A508f./B536f.) 
As a result, "understanding's greatest possible use in experience" (CPR, A516/B544) 
is secured and understanding is hence directed to certain goal by reason {ibid., 
A644/B672). This would avoid ourselves taking what is unconditioned, which refers 
actually to the totality of our experience, as object of cognition. From the above 
analysis of the antinomies we saw that the unconditioned totality is either not itself 
being given, as the in case of mathematical antinomy, or it is conceptually not a part 
of the series of conditions, as in the case of dynamical antinomy. Hence upon 
discovering this character of the unconditioned reason regulates the use of 
understanding as not to take anything as unconditioned, as this would mean that the 
unconditioned is reachable cognitively. This first sense of regulative function of 
reason is to avoid reason's self-contradiction, and it hinges on the ability of reason to 
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draw the bound between the sensible and the supersensible, which is in other words 
an ability o f reason for self-criticism. 
There is another sense of the regulative function of reason, namely, the function 
o f bringing about a "systematic character of cognition" (CPR, A645/B673). This 
regulative function o f reason is closely related to the above principle of the greatest 
possible continuation and expansion of experience. It drives our understanding to 
seek a unity based on one principle, although this principle is a mere idea, a focus 
imaginarius (ibid., A644/B672). Kant thinks that it is indeed a logical maxim for us 
“to diminish as much as possible this seeming diversity" {ibid., A649/B677) o f 
cognition and gives cognition a possible unity, or else there w i l l be "no sufficient 
mark o f empirical truth" {ibid., A651/B679). While on the other hand, i f there is a 
logical principle o f genera, there must be another balancing principle of species, 
which "requires o f things―regardless o f their agreement under the same 
genus-manifoldness and diversity" {ibid., A654/B682). These two principles are 
indeed obvious principles o f thinking; however, i f cognition is not to become a 
rhapsody, then there must be a way to unite the above two principles and give 
systematic unity to cognition. There needs another principle which complete "the 
systematic coherence both in ascending to higher genera and in descending to lower 
species，，(ibid., A658/B686) and that is the principle of the '''continuity of forms" 
iibid.).^^ This regulative idea of reason would somehow relate to the teleological 
judgement in the third Critique, which I will explicate in chapter three. 
From the above we can see that it is not only important for the 
self-contradiction of reason to be solved, but also the whole of our cognition under 
the direction of reason should give a systematic unity. The regulative principles of 
Hoffe gives an excellent account of this regulative function of reason in relation to scientific 
research, see Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, pp. 130-134. 
Chapter One 47 
reason in the second sense, as means for systematic unity, "seem to be 
transcendental" (CPR, A664/B692), yet we lack any means for a deduction of them. 
As a result, besides being a condition of possibility of a transcendental philosophy, 
the supersensible connection of reason seems to be required also in theoretical 
cognition itself. The systematic unity required by cognition is not given from the 
sensible intuition, but somehow related to the supersensible; I will give an account 
of this problem in the following chapters. Nevertheless, we can see at this stage that 
there seems to require certain supersensible ground, or as in third Critique, 
supersensible substrate, in order to render our cognition systematic; but this 
supersensible substrate cannot be an object of theoretical cognition. This peculiar 
status of the supersensible substrate forces Kant to have given an account, which he 
intended to accomplish in the third Critique. 
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VI. Conclusion to the Chapter 
From the above discussion we can sum up this chapter in the following way. 
Although proved in the second Critique that reason does have a real connection to 
the supersensible from a practical perspective, there is still a tension between the 
two poles of the system, namely, between the supersensible principle of freedom and 
the sensible principle of nature. From the very beginning, a transcendental 
philosophy requires reason's connection to the supersensible. Yet, this very 
supersensible is not to be cognized in a theoretical sense. Moreover, our cognition to 
nature seems to require a supersensible substrate, which would in the end render 
truth as such. This supersensible substrate is assumed problematically as a regulative 
principle of reason, which arranges experience into a systematic unity, making 
possible a notion of truth. However, it seems that the only supersensible substrate 
that could be asserted with certainty is in human practice. Reason needs to solve this 
conflict between nature and freedom. Between the two poles of supersensible, 
namely that of the problematic pole of nature and that of the certain pole of freedom, 
there must be continuity, if I am allowed to use analogically the regulative principle 
of continuity for systematic unity of theoretical cognition. Between the perspective 
of theoretical reason and of practical reason there must be a certain way of transition, 
if not true reconciliation,49 for reason to find its true unity. This continuity as a 
transit forms an essential part of transcendental philosophy. This is the theoretical 
reason why after the writing of the two Critiques Kant thought that a third was 
needed for the completion of the system of pure reason. The power of judgement is 
the transition between these two perspectives of reason. To close this chapter, I shall 
quote in full a passage from the "Prize Essay," where Kant summed up the task of 
See Klaus Dusing, "Beauty as the Transition from Nature to Freedom in Kant's Critique of 
Judgment” Nous 24 (1990): 79-92, where he contrasts Kant's idea of mediation as a transition to that 
of the idealist idea of higher unity. 
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transcendental philosophy as a transit to the supersensible:^® 
Transcendental philosophy, i.e., the doctrine of the 
possibility of all a priori knowledge as such, which is that 
critique of pure reason whose elements have now been 
completely set forth, has as its purpose the founding of a 
metaphysics, whose purpose in turn envisages as an aim of 
pure reason the extension of the latter from the limits of the 
sensible to the field of the super-sensible; a transit which, if 
it is not to be a dangerous leap, seeing that it is not, after all, 
a continuous progression in the same order of principles, 
makes necessary a scrupulous attention to the bounds of 
both domains, which obstructs progress. (PE, 364, XX, 
272f.) 
50 Henrich, besides taking the sources from "Prize Essay," also illustrated this point from the text of 
Opus postumum, see Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, pp. 52-54. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Transition from Nature to Freedom and the Power of Judgement 
„Der Mensch ist ein schaffender Riickblick 
der Natur auf sich selbst. “ 
Friedrich Schlegel, Ideen 
I. Introduction: From Urtheil to Urtheilskraft 
With the above discussion of the emergence of the supersensible in the Critique of 
Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason, we now come to see that Kant 
has a systematic problem to deal with. Although human reason falls into the illusion 
of antinomy naturally, with reason's philosophical self-reflection the antinomy can 
actually be avoided. The self-critical power of human reason differentiates 
transcendentally the supersensible conditions of cognition and the sensible cognition 
as such. The possibility of human having reason hinges on this very power of 
self-critique. However, as discussed above, this very power of self-critique and 
hence an ability of differentiation between the supersensible and the sensible 
presupposed that reason, if there is one, must have certain connection to the 
supersensible. This connection was shown by the analysis of human practice, where 
Kant grounded practical freedom as the human supersensible. Nevertheless, the 
establishment of the supersensible practical freedom has not helped to explain folly 
reason's connection to the supersensible. The supersensible freedom established can 
only determine our action in a practical sense, however, the supersensible 
presupposed for the possibility of transcendental philosophy and cognition seems to 
be a theoretical one. In other words, we lack any exhibit cognition of the 
supersensible freedom. Whenever we act morally, freedom is exhibited; but freedom 
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itself is not cognizable theoretically. As a result, the supersensible assumed in the 
first Critique remains as a problematic presupposition, despite the grounding or the 
positive assertion of that in the second Critique. The two parts of philosophy, namely, 
the theoretical and the practical, give eventually a dualistic world picture. How these 
parts of philosophy, together with the world views they provided, can be unified in a 
systematic way seems to be a problem Kant has to solve. 
This systematic problem of the philosophy of Kant is thought to have been the 
major concern of the third critical work, the Critique of the Power of Judgement.^^ 
As mentioned in chapter one, I prefer the use of "power of judgement" over that of 
"judgement" in the title of the third Critique, in order to distinguish between the two 
concepts of ''Urtheir and ''Urtheilskraft.'' Urtheil, translated usually as 
"judgement," is a sole logical term when compared with the concept of Urtheilskraft. 
In the lecture of Logic, Kant explained the concept of Urtheil as the following: 
A judgement {Urtheil) is the presentation of the unity of the 
consciousness of several presentations, or the presentation 
of their relation so far as they make up one concept. (Logic, 
106) 
In the first Critique, Kant said that all acts of understanding can be reduced to 
judgements and hence 'the understanding as such can be presented as a power of 
judgment. ” {Wir konnen aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urtheile 
zuriicl^hren, so dafi der Verstand uberhaupt als ein Vermogen zu urtheilen 
vorgestellt werden kann.) (CPR, A69/B94). We can see that when Kant used the 
word “Urtheir, what he meant was the result of the logical act of understanding 
51 Although Allison argued that there is a shift of focus seen from the rewriting of the introduction of 
the work, which he thought that Kant had moved away from the systematic problem. I shall discuss 
this issue in the last chapter of this thesis. 
“ O n e should notice that although Pluhar's translation here is the “power of judgment," nevertheless, 
the corresponding German phrase is "ein Vermogen zu urtheilen" instead of '"Urtheilskraft" My 
thesis supervisor suggested that a more exact translation would be "a power to judge." 
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Upon bringing unity to consciousness. The logical act of understanding that brings 
unity to consciousness is not the major subject matter of the third Critique. For this 
sense of judgement Kant has given an account in the deduction of the categories. 
Through the transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant showed us that the act 
of understanding is necessary for the constitution of all objects. In the third Critique, 
Kant's main undertaking, however, was to deal with the very power and principle of 
judgement as such. 
In the "Introduction" to the "Analytic of Principles" of the first Critique, Kant 
contrasted the acts of understanding, which can be explicated “as our power of 
rules’，{das Vermogen der Regeln) (CPR, A132/B171), with the “ability to subsume 
under rules" (das Vermogen unter Regeln zu subsumieren) {ibid.). This ability of 
subsuming under rules is the Urtheilskraft,^^ i.e. the power of judgement. It is 
further qualified as the ability "to distinguish whether something does or does not 
fall under a given rule" (ibid.). Here we see that "judgement" takes a two-fold sense. 
The result of the act of collecting and synthesising different presentations to form a 
unity is the first sense of judgement, which falls under the concept of Urtheil. 
However, the Urtheil formed is due to an act of understanding {eine Handlung des 
Verstandes), and there must be underlying power and principles telling us how those 
presentations should be brought together to form a unity. From the transcendental 
deduction we read that in order for us to give unity to objects, categories as 
universals are applied to the manifolds as particulars. This application of the 
categories is a problem of subsumption, and belongs to the second sense of the word 
"judgement" as Urtheilskraft” Formally speaking, this power of judgement is the 
53 The German original of the sentence contrasting understanding with the power of judgement reads: 
„Wenn der Verstand uberhaupt als das Vermogen der Regeln erkldrt wird, so ist Urtheilskraft das 
Vermogen unter Regeln zu subsumiren..." (CPR, A132/B171). We can see clearly that Kant referred 
the ability of subsuming under rules as the power of judgement. 
Indeed, Kant in the first Critique told us that the power of judgement in daily expression is a 
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power of relating universal to particulars.^^ In the case of the pure concepts of 
understanding, the procedure of their application to the sensible intuition is the 
schematism. The categories are applied through the transcendental determination of 
time. In this case, the power of judgement is both determinative and reflective^^ (CJ, 
401，XX, 212). It is determinative as the ‘"universal (the rule, principle, law) is 
given" (CJ, 18，V，179)，the role of the power of judgement is only subsuming the 
particular intuition under the categories. Yet, what is peculiar is that the power of 
judgement here is reflective as well, which I shall try to explain in the following. 
Kant told us in the introduction to the “Schematism” that in general logic, i f we 
need to know how the rules are to be applied to the particular cases, we seek again 
another rule (CPR, A133/B172). That means we seem to demand a rule of 
application/subsumption beyond the applied universal and the particulars. The 
instructive rule of subsumption for categories, Kant thought, is "[contained] in the 
concept of nature ^ ^ as such" (CJ, 401，XX, 212). In this case the rule of 
subsumption is given as the concept of nature as such.58 We should note that, when 
we speak of a successful subsumption, we presume two things. First, that there is a 
rule; secondly, that the rule is applicable to the particulars in accordance with certain 
rule of subsumption. Indeed these two points reciprocally support each other, as it 
makes no sense to say that there is a rule for the particular which is not applicable to 
mother wit (CPR, A133/B172); nevertheless, transcendental poM>er of judgements {transscendentale 
Urtheilskrafi), i.e. the power of subsuming the sensible intuition under the categories, can and must 
be specified and explicated through transcendental philosophy {ibid., A135/B174f.). 
Or, as formulated by Kant, it is the "ability to think the particular as contained under the universal" 
(CJ, 18，V’ 179). 
56 Henry E. Allison gave a detailed account of this problem in his recent book. See Henry E. Allison, 
Kant，s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 13-30. 
57 "Nature" here refers to the mechanistic sense of nature accounted for in the first Critique, as 
termed by Kant as a "universal concept of nature" (CJ, 401, XX, 212) and it forms a system only in 
terms of transcendental laws (CJ, 397, XX, 208); it should be distinguished from the sense of nature 
that forms a system in terms of empirical law (CJ, 398，XX, 209). Details will be discussed 
momentarily. 
58 I wi l l in the following discuss this issue of schematism in relation to the deduction of the aesthetic 
judgement. 
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that particular case. From the analysis above we can see that, whenever we judge, i.e. 
subsuming the particulars under universal rules, we presumed that there is a rule for 
this subsumption and that a rule must be found. Kant told us that, this power of 
presuming (CJ, 393, XX, 204; as prdsumiren) is the power to find the universal for 
the particulars when no universal is given (CJ, 18f., V’ 179); and this is the reflective 
power of judgement. As a result, the power to judge with categories actually 
demands a reflective use of the power of judgement, as Allison tried to point out. 
Moreover, we can now add one more sense of the word "judgement" to the two-fold 
sense mentioned above. "Judgement" takes three different senses in Kant's 
philosophy, namely the result of the act of understanding as Urtheil; the 
subsumption of the particulars under universals, and the presumption of the 
universals, both referred as Urtheilskraft. The very presumptive power of judgement 
is what Kant called the reflective power of judgement.^^ 
Besides justifying my use of the phrase "power of judgement" upon translating 
the German term Urtheilskraft the above discussion as well points to the subject 
matter of the third Critique. Kant explicitly pointed out that in this work he wanted 
to give an account of the a priori principle of the reflective power of judgement. As 
mentioned above, Kant had already given an account of the transcendental power of 
judgement in the case of categories' application; however, in the third Critique he 
wanted to give an individual account of the reflective power of judgement. The 
reason for this wi l l be given in the following. 
59 Why the reflective power of judgement is presumptive should be shown and proved in my later 
discussion of the reflective judgement. 
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II. Experience as a System and the Urtheilskraft 
Kant seemed to have solved the problem of Urtheilskraft with an account of the 
schematism in the first Critique. The rule of judging of categories is the universal 
concept of nature as such. Understanding, with its categories, "constitutes a system 
in terms of transcendental laws" (CJ, 397，XX, 208); for it is the requirement of the 
unity of consciousness as the condition of possibility of experience (CPR, 
B136-139). As a result, the particulars which are to be subsumed under the 
categories must in a certain sense form a system as well. In the context of discussion 
of the first Critique, the particulars are limited to the sense of the two sensible forms 
of intuition (CPR, A22/B36); and in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" we can see that 
the structures of the forms of space and time make possible the "thorough 
connection of everything" (CJ, 397，XX, 208). In this sense of a thorough 
connection of everything the sum total of appearance forms also a system, and this 
harmony of the two systems (that of understanding and of sensibility) is the 
universal concept of nature as such and the rule ofjudging of categories.^ ® 
However, the problem remains when we consider also the empirical laws, 
which entail empirical sciences. Although Kant told us that the formal conditions of 
possibility of experience, i.e. the categories and the sensible forms of intuition, 
together with their operation, the transcendental laws, form a system, nevertheless, 
nothing was said about the real content of experience. There is no proof that 
empirical laws also form a system. Yet, i f empirical sciences are possible at all, then 
our investigation of nature must presuppose that the form of empirical objects 
“harmonize generically” (CJ, 401，XX, 213); or else no empirical law can be 
cognised by human observers. To the end, the nature as a whole with respect to the 
60 Again, I shall explain this issue in detail with the discussion of schematism in the later part of this 
chapter. 
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content of its objects must be a system. Although the systematicity of nature is not 
given, human observers presuppose that and try to organise empirical objects in 
accordance with this systematicity. This presupposition of the systematicity of nature 
takes the form of the reflective power of judgement. ^ ^ Not only does this 
presupposition make a reflective use of the power of judgement, Kant wanted to say 
it can only be reflective and cannot be determinative,^^ as we have no ground to 
assert that nature does have such systematicity. Here the power of judgement deals 
with nature ‘‘technically�rather than schematically" (CJ, 402, XX, 213). That is 
why Kant thought that the principle of this power of judgement "cannot come from 
the understanding" (CJ, 398’ XX, 210), and hence, it requires an individual 
investigation. The following passage should indicate finely the theoretical 
demarcation between technical procedure of reflective judgement and the schematic 
procedure of determinative judgement: 
It is not determinative judgment, but merely reflective 
judgment, that has a priori principles of its own. 
Determinative judgment proceeds only schematically, 
under laws of another power (the understanding), and 
reflective judgment alone proceeds technically (according 
to laws of its own). (CJ, 438，XX, 248) 
61 Although the concept of reflection takes numerous of different senses in the philosophy of Kant, 
Allison pointed out that there is one common feature these different senses share, namely, the 
structure of "comparison based on given representations." See Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste, pp. 
20f. 
The procedures of the power of judgement mentioned in this and the above section, I think, 
both share this common feature. In Ae above section, the application of the pure concepts of 
understanding involves a comparison between the presentation of the conceptual content of the 
categories and that of the form of intuition; hence, it is both determinative and reflective. While here 
we compare the presentation of empirical objects with that of the assumed idea of nature's 
systematicity, and bring the objects under empirical laws and concepts that harmonize generically. I 
shall discuss this problem in detail in the later part of this thesis. 
62 Again, for the problem of the distinction between the determinate and the indeterminate, see 
Seung-Kee Lee, "The Determinate-Indeterminate Distinction and Kant's Theory of Judgment," 
Kant-Studien 95 (2004): 204-225. Basically, Kant called a judgement determinative when there is 
given sensible intuition for determining the use of categories; hence determinative judgement must 
proceed schematically. See also my discussion of the schematism in the later part of this chapter. 
3 I shall give a detailed account of the concept of "technic of nature" in chapter three. 
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From the above we can see that although the power of judgement is required when 
determinative judgement proceeds schematically, this power of judgement actually 
serves understanding. It proceeds according to the rules of understanding and the 
concept of nature, which the formal rules implied. However, when we judge nature 
technically by means of reflective judgement, reflective power of judgement 
proceeds in accordance with the law of its own. The status of the law of reflective 
judgement became a problem which Kant had to address to. It is now clear that the 
subject matter of the third Critique is the principle of this reflective power of 
judgement as such. 
After thematizing the subject matter of the third Critique, one further question 
must be answered. The question is why the power of judgement becomes the subject 
matter of a critique. It is probably admitted without dispute that the first two 
Critiques are reason's self reflection on its theoretical and practical employments. 
When we compare the nature of these two works with that of the third Critique, we 
cannot help but question about the difference between their subject matters. From 
the beginning, although we can say that the power of judgement as a cognitive 
power is one of the powers or operations of Reason in general; yet, the power of 
judgement seems to be a more inferior power among the higher cognitive powers, 
when compared with the two generic aspects of reason's employment, namely the 
theoretical and the practical aspects of reason. The reason is that the two aspects of 
reason's employment give two distinctive objects with respect to their origin (CJ, 
385，XX, 195). However, the power of judgement does not seem to give a distinctive 
kind of object; it seems to be a subordinate part of the two different employments of 
reason. In other words, it has its own a priori principles despite its having no object, 
why this power itself requires a critique, is a question which has to be answered 
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properly. 
Moreover, in the beginning of this chapter I pointed out that there is a 
systematic problem Kant needed to address with the writing of the third Critique. 
This problem wil l be further related to the major concern of this thesis, namely, how 
the reflective power of judgement gives a transition from the sensible to the 
supersensible. This transition may in the end systematically unify the duality of the 
theoretically cognizable nature and the practically determined freedom. This 
transition is where the possibility of transcendental philosophy hinges on. I shall in 
the following give a preliminary discussion of how Kant saw the relation between 
the problem of reflective power of judgement and the systematic problem of his 
philosophy. 
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III. System of Philosophy and the Urtheilskraft 
The "Introduction"^'^ of the third Critique provides fruitful materials for the above 
mentioned problems. There Kant told us that "our cognitive power as a whole has 
two domains, that of the concept of nature and that of the concept of freedom" (CJ, 
13, V，174). The two domains have their legislations from the understanding and the 
reason respectively, and the objects given from the two concepts are the theoretically 
cognizable nature and the practically determined freedom. Nevertheless, these two 
kinds of legislation share the same territory of the sum total of all possible 
experience {ibid.). Here the problem is that although these two kinds of legislation 
share the same territory, yet they never form one domain (CJ, 14, V, 175). It means 
that they give two distinctive, non-reducible kinds of object, because these two kinds 
of legislation are in principle distinctive and non-commensurable. At the first glance, 
this seems to be acceptable as long as these two kinds of legislation do not 
contradict each other.^^ However, as I argued in the first chapter, i f this duality of 
legislation could not be unified in a systematic way, then, there are reasons for us to 
advocate scepticism against Kant's critical philosophy. Kant in the "Introduction" 
demonstrated this problem with the discussion of the domain of philosophy. He 
pointed out that the concept of nature does not allow us to present its objects as 
似 Kant wrote a longer introduction to the third Critique which was published in a later time than the 
work itself, and is now commonly call the "First Introduction." Although many scholars have pointed 
out that there were obvious shift of focus between the two Introductions, however, with reference to 
my discourse here I do not see any potential distortion of meaning even when I do not discuss these 
two separately. Here I only intend to give a brief account of how Kant saw the relation between the 
problem of reflective power of judgement in general and the systematic problem of his philosophy; 
and the shift of focus from "aesthetic judgment of reflection" to the "nature and possibility of an 
aesthetic representation of purposiveness" is not relevant to my account here (Or, it is at least not yet 
relevant to my general introduction to the problem of the third Critique here; I will in the later part 
give a brief account of this shift when I am to discuss the aesthetic judgement). It is the reason why I 
did not explicitly distinguish these two introductions when I was making reference, but only showed 
the difference with the volume number of the Akademie edition (where the published, second 
introduction comes together with the work itself from volume V，while the "First Introduction" comes 
from volume XX). C.f, Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste, pp. 55-59. 
65 Indeed, Kant pointed out in the "Introduction" that the concept of nature and the concept of 
freedom are proved to be not contradictory in the first Critique, through the analysis of the third 
antinomy (CJ, 13f.，V’ 175). 
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things in themselves; while the concept of freedom does not allow us to present its 
objects in intuition. According to Kant's principle of theoretical cognition, 
everything cognizable theoretically must have been given in intuition. As a result, 
Kant argued that: 
[ . . . ] s o neither concept can provide us with theoretical 
cognition of its object (or even of the thinking subject) as 
things in themselves, which would be the supersensible. 
(CJ, 14，V，175) 
Kant then told us that the idea of the supersensible is needed for “the possibility of 
all those objects of experience" {ibid.\ however, the idea itself cannot be objects of 
theoretical cognition. This analysis is indeed having the same conclusion as my 
analysis given in the first chapter. Moreover, he pointed out that this cognitively 
inaccessible “realm of the supersensible" {ibid.) can only have "practical reality 
ipraktische Realitdt�” {ibid.). Hence, there is "an immense gulf，{ibid) between 
these domains, ‘‘just as i f they were two different worlds" (CJ, 15, V，176). It is 
indeed the systematic problem I pointed out in the first chapter.^^ 
Kant saw this systematic problem to be a problem of transition (Ubergang). 
Between the sensible world of nature and the supersensible world of freedom, a 
transition must be possible, or else these worlds cannot be unified in a systematic 
way. Here Kant drew an analogy from the relations among our higher cognitive 
powers, namely, among understanding, the power of judgement, and reason. He told 
us that between understanding and reason, the mediating link is the power of 
judgement (CJ, 16，V，177). He hence suggested that we can assume "at least 
66 For conceptual demarcation among "realm," "territory," and "domain," my thesis supervisor in 
one of his earlier articles has made a helpful diagram showing their relationship with the cognitive 
powers of the mind. See關子尹著：『判斷力批判與康德超驗哲學的完成』，〈鶴湖月刊〉，第一卷’ 
第七、八、九期’一九七六。[Tze-wan, Kwan，”0衍分《6 and the Completion of the 
Transcendental Philosophy of Kant," Legein Monthly 1:7’ 8，9, 1976.]，p. 20 of the 8th issue. 
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provisionally’’ (CJ, 17，V, 178) that 
[ . . . ] judgment w i l l bring about a transition from the pure 
cognitive power, i.e., from the domain of the concepts of 
nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in 
its logical use it makes possible the transition from 
understanding to reason. (CJ, 18，V，179) 
Here we can see that Kant thought that the power of judgement is a candidate of the 
element that wi l l bring about the systematic transition between the concept of nature 
and the concept of freedom. Although Paul Guyer has argued that the analogy made 
by Kant is highly artificial and cannot be taken as a part of his overall argument, I 
wi l l not discuss this problem here. I want to leave all the evaluative problems of the 
theoretical status of reflective judgement to the last chapter of my thesis, after the 
detailed discussion and interpretation of the reflective power of judgement. As a 
result, I wi l l first follow Kant's analogy and grant that the power of judgement is a 
possible candidate. 
There is another clue that Kant has provided in the "Introduction." That seems 
to me to be a more convincing clue than that of the analogy. In the last section, I 
mentioned that when we articulate experience as a system of empirical laws, 
reflective power of judgement proceeds technically. Although I do not want to go 
into detailed discussion of the concept of the technic of nature, I want to make a few 
points here that would help our understanding of the role of judgement in bringing 
about the transition. To deal with nature technically is to deal with it artistically (CJ, 
402，XX, 214). Reflective power of judgement sees nature as purposively arranged; 
where nature's particular laws "are [made] suitable for the possibility of experience 
as a system" {ibid.). It sees nature as arranged in a way as i f an artist is arranging the 
67 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claim of Taste, second edition, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp. 29-34. 
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colours, the patterns and the lines of a drawing; all these elements of the drawing are 
arranged in the way that they together make possible the picture as a whole. 
Particular laws in nature are considered to be arranged in a way that is possible for 
them to constitute a systematic whole, as i f there is an artist of nature behind the 
scene. This means that nature is seen by reflective power of judgement as arranged 
according to the concept of a system; and we called that purposive, because reason 
somehow demands us to make sense of this contingent systematic arrangement of 
AC 
nature with reference to our purposive practice. Hence, reflective power of 
judgement makes it possible for us to see nature not merely as mechanical but also 
as purposive, although this purposiveness of nature cannot become an object of 
theoretical cognition, as it is not determinative (meaning that no intuition of this 
purposiveness is given). 
When Kant discussed the transition in the "Introduction," there is a peculiar, yet 
important passage, which would shed light on the problem of the clue. I here quote 
in full: 
Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being such 
that the lawfulness in its form wi l l harmonize with at least 
the possibility of [achieving] the purposes that we are to 
achieve in nature according to laws of freedom. (CJ, 15, V, 
176) 
Here we see that Kant seemed to think that it must be possible for us to see nature as 
having certain kind of purposiveness, instead of as being governed by blind 
mechanism. Reflective power of judgement makes possible this seeing. As a result, 
there is at least a reason for Kant to think that reflective judgement plays this role of 
transition. I wil l leave the discussion of this concept of purposiveness of nature for 
68 I shall explain this point in Chapter Four. 
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the later part; I only want to point out that there is a reason for Kant to thematize the 
reflective power of judgement for the systematic problem he was facing. 
Moreover, what is even peculiar is that, the transition is made possible by "a 
basis uniting the supersensible {einen Grund der Einheit des Ubersinnlichen) that 
underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains 
practically" (CJ, 15, V，176). This basis is neither theoretically, nor practically, 
cognizable, yet, as a transition, it unifies the underlying supersensible of nature and 
the supersensible contained in the concept of freedom. I f such a basis is possible at 
all, then, for one thing, reflective power of judgement does really bring about a 
transition from the sensible to the supersensible; as the supersensible which unifies 
the two supersensible of nature and freedom is the realm of supersensible that we 
"base on it the possibility of all those objects of experience" (CJ, 14, V，175). 
Experience as a whole, including the sensible cognition and the supersensible 
practice, is then found to be based and unified on this realm of the supersensible 
through our reflective power of judgement. In addition, once this systematic 
problem is solved, the possibility of the transcendental philosophy wi l l then be 
saved. We can see why Kant needed to proceed with a third critique of the power of 
judgement in order to complete his system (CJ, 431, XX, 242). 
In the rest of this chapter, I wi l l first give an interpretive account of the concept 
of reflective power of judgement through a detailed analysis of aesthetic judgement. 
After that, I wi l l in chapter three discuss how the concept of reflective power of 
judgement itself implies also a concept of the supersensible and how this 
supersensible can be understood as the supersensible basis of human experience. 
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IV. Aesthetic Judgement as Reflective Power of Judgement 
As mentioned above, Kant needed to discover the principle of the reflective power 
of judgement as such. It was said that this principle of judgement cannot come from 
understanding, for understanding can only proceed schematically.^^ It cooperates 
with sensibility to yield theoretical cognition. However, when we presuppose nature 
as a system, this presupposition cannot be a theoretical cognition, as we lack any 
intuition of the purposiveness and systematicity of nature. Hence, the presupposition 
of nature's systematicity can only be a reflective procedure of judgement. On the 
other hand, this principle of judgement cannot come from reason. Although the 
above mentioned presupposition of nature's purposiveness is actually depicted by 
Kant as teleological judgement, and that this kind of judgement "follows the 
principle of reason” (CJ, 433，XX, 244); the principle of judgement itself cannot be 
a principle of reason but must be a principle in its own right. The only objects that 
are entailed from the principle of reason are those of the good and the evil (CPrR, 78, 
V，58). Kant in the second Critique told us that the good as an object is only possible 
as a “consequence of the a priori determination of the will，，(ibid., 86，V, 65). The 
determination of the wil l , as discussed in the first chapter, does not depend on the 
given. Hence, it is not at all something^om nature. Whenever we refer nature to the 
purposiveness of our practice, what we really do is just presuming nature's 
systematicity having the same structure as our practice, instead of directly applying 
the principle of reason to it. As a result, our presupposition of nature's systematicity 
follows the concept of reason only reflectively, without applying it to nature. I wi l l 
explain this point in chapter three; but so far we must see that the principle of 
judgement cannot in anyway equate the principle of reason. 
69 Kant has said that the use of understanding is limited to the sensible, proceeding schematically. 
See CPR, A146-147/B185-187. 
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I f the above analysis is correct, then the power of judgement seems to be an 
independent power of human mind. The technic of nature perceived (CJ, 407, XX, 
219) is actually a perception of the purposiveness of the power of judgement (CJ, 
408，XX, 220). It is because as mentioned above, the systematicity or purposiveness 
of nature is neither an intuitively given quality of nature, nor a legitimate concept of 
our understanding upon cognising nature. As a result, Kant wrote: 
So it is actually the power of judgment that is technical; 
nature is presented as technical only insofar as it 
harmonizes with, and [so] necessitates, that [technical] 
procedure o f judgment. (CJ, 408，XX，220) 
The meaning and the mechanism of this harmony I shall explicate in the following 
section, for it is also related to the problem of deduction aesthetic judgement. I only 
intend to point out here that, when reflective judgement judges subjectively, without 
referring to a determinate concept and hence non-cognitive, Kant thought that it is 
an aesthetic judgement (CJ, 409，XX, 221). It involves the harmony between 
imagination and understanding which gives a feeling of pleasure and displeasure. On 
the other hand, when it proceeds objectively, referring to the concept of reason, it is 
a teleological judgement (ibid.). It is cognitive刊 and it harmonizes understanding 
with reason. Although aesthetic and teleological judgement have different content in 
their procedure, they are nevertheless ‘‘contained in one ability and resting on the 
same principle” (CJ, 434, XX, 244), namely, the principle of the reflective power of 
judgement, which regards nature as technical (CJ, 439, XX, 249). However, between 
these two kinds of reflective judgement, aesthetic judgement is "the only one in 
which the basis determining [it] lies solely in the power of judgment, unmixed with 
70 Here the sense of the word does not refer to theoretical, determinative cognition. It is cognitive 
when compared to aesthetic judgement only because it involves the concept of reason, and it is in a 
certain sense regulating our theoretical cognition of nature. 
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an[y] other cognitive power" (CJ, 433，XX, 243). As a result, Kant started his third 
Critique with an analysis of the aesthetic judgement. It explicates the structure of 
harmony with reference to the principle of reflective power of judgement itself 
before going into an account of how understanding (nature) and reason (freedom) 
get harmonized through teleological judgement. Theoretically speaking, it is 
therefore a necessary first step to take in Kant's account of reflective judgement. It is 
also what I wi l l do in the following. 
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V. The Moments of Taste 
Kant has declared in the "Introduction" that the critique of taste has a more general 
"transcendental aim，，(CJ, 7, V，170) rather than a mere inquiry of aesthetics/theory 
of arts in particular. The thematization of aesthetic judgement is a way to unveil the 
reflective power of judgement. As a result, I wil l not in this thesis handle the issues 
of aesthetics implied by Kant's theory of taste. 
As Kant thought that the principle of judgement is transcendental, it is a priori 
instead of empirical or psychological, it too requires a deduction. Kant started off his 
account of the aesthetic judgement with the "Analytic." The four moments of taste 
wi l l show us that, although aesthetic judgement has its basis as a priori, the structure 
of its basis is very different from the a priori principles of understanding and reason. 
Hence, the deduction of taste takes quite a different path when compared with that of 
the categories and freedom. I wi l l in the following briefly discuss the four moments 
of taste, in order to make sense of the peculiarities of aesthetic judgement. These 
peculiarities of taste make the principle of aesthetic judgement stands out as a 
genuine self-grounding principle, distinguishable from the other cognitive principles 
of the mind. As long as it is a principle distinguishable from understanding and 
reason, Kant thought that it could somehow fill "the gap in the system of our 
cognitive powers”?' (CJ, 434, XX, 244). 
First Moment: Taste as disinterested 
The first moment of taste starts with quality of taste.^ ^ Kant told us that taste is a 
71 I f the principle of judgement is reducible either to understanding or reason, then the whole system 
of the mind and of transcendental philosophy would rest on, or derived from, one of these two 
principles. That would in the end breach with the basic distinction between the concept of nature and 
the concept of freedom; which is the heart of his philosophy. Dieter Henrich pointed out that what 
distinguishes Kantian system with the idealist system is the multidimensionality Kant introduced. See 
Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, pp. 38-45, 65-81. 
72 Kant analysed the judgement of taste with reference to logical functions of judging, as he thought 
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feeling of pleasure and displeasure {das Gefiihl der Lust und Unlust) (CJ, 44, V, 203). 
Moreover, this feeling of pleasure and displeasure is subjective. It is not objective 
because it does not refer to an object, be it sensational or rational, but only to how 
the subject feels himself {ibid.). As a result, Kant summed up this structure of taste 
as one that is disinterested. Interest, as understood by Kant, refers necessarily to an 
object's existence (CJ, 45, V，204). However, taste refers only to the subject's 
presentational powers, i.e. how imagination and understanding interact with each 
other upon presenting an object. How these two powers relate to each other upon 
cognition I wi l l explain momentarily: generally speaking, the power of imagination 
takes up what is given in intuition while understanding holds together 
(zusammenfassen) the manifold given in accordance with the unity of consciousness 
(CJ, 408，XX, 220). As a result, taste does not refer to the existence of object but to 
how imagination and understanding interact with each other, where the interaction 
yields certain feeling of pleasure or displeasure. For example, when we read the 
novel of Kundera, it does not matter whether we read that from a book bought from 
bookstore or from the e-book downloaded from the internet. The material existence 
of the novel does not determine how we like or dislike the novel itself. It is the 
elements of the narration that trigger the activities of our cognitive powers that 
induce the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. 
Kant here wanted to distinguish taste from the sensational agreeable and the 
rational good, which are interested likings. Agreeableness ‘‘gratifies us" (CJ, 48, V， 
207), it refers to our inclination towards certain qualities of an object. When I say I 
like the taste of chicken, I am actually referring to the sensational affection given to 
me by the material existence of the chicken. It requires no judgement for this kind of 
that even taste “has reference to the understanding" (CJ, 43’ V’ 203). However, the first moment of 
taste begins with quality, as he thought that aesthetic judgement concerned with that first {ibid). 
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l iking {ibid.)\ and that this kind of liking does not have an a priori principle at all, 
for everyone may find different things agreeable according to their personal taste. 
On the other hand, taste cannot be a liking of goodness, as goodness is a concept of 
reason. Goodness can either be intrinsic, where it is good for its own sake; or it can 
be relative, where it is good for the purpose of something else. In both cases, the 
kind of liking hopes for the existence of the good to be actualized and that we must 
have a determinate concept of it (CJ, 49，V’ 207). As a result, the liking of goodness 
refers to the principle of reason rather than that of judgement, and i f it is a principle 
of reason, then it cannot have a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. In the second 
Critique, we have already seen that reason's determination of the wi l l does not 
involve such kind of feeling, although there is a feeling of respect for the law (CPrR, 
98f.，IV, 
The first moment of taste told us that, i f there is a taste which induces a feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure, then it can neither be merely sensational nor rational. 
For i f it is mere sensation, it lacks any a priori principle; but i f it is rational, then it 
belongs to reason and does not bring a feeling of pleasure and displeasure to the 
subject. As a result, it is disinterested and refers only to itself as a subject. 
Second Moment: Taste as universal 
The second moment concerns with the quantity of taste. Following the above 
exposition, taste is not a mere sensational agreeableness which hinges on personal 
preference. One must believe that whenever something is judged to be beautiful, "it 
must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone" (CJ, 54，V’ 211). It is 
in fact not difficult to understand, as when we say that something is beautiful, the 
73 The feeling of respect for the law is certainly not the same as the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure; refer to the chapter "On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason" in Critique of Practical 
Reason. 
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meaning of the statement goes beyond the reference of a personal claim. We can 
meaningfully say that " I like the taste of chicken; but I don't know for the others!" 
However, when we say, “The Wanderer above the Sea of Mist is a beautiful piece of 
painting!" We expect others to agree with us. The claim of beauty goes beyond 
personal interest, not like the case of the liking of food, as the claim of beauty is 
itself disinterested. Hence, Kant wrote: 
He must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar 
l iking from everyone because he cannot discover, 
underlying this liking, any private conditions, on which 
only he might be dependent.. .He cannot discover such 
private conditions because his l iking is not based on any 
inclination he has. ..(CJ, 54’ V，211) 
In the case of preference for food, the "private conditions" that determine the liking 
could come from various factors, including the race, habitation, even genetic 
determination. Hence, liking of the agreeable cannot be universal. However, taste 
does have a structure of universal claim, as z/it is a logical judgement (CJ, 54, V, 
211). As a result, the basis determining taste seems to be something other than that 
of the agreeable. 
Nevertheless, the universality of taste is not from concept. It is because "from 
concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" (ibid.). 
Conceptually speaking, it is contradictory to say that the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure is from concept. I f it is the case, then it would mean that we possess a 
concept of liking, that we could apply to objects which instantiate this concept. 
Following that, the object presented has certain quality of agreeableness, which 
makes it possible to instantiate the concept of liking we possess; and this kind of 
agreeableness is actually the sensational agreeable we mentioned above. The only 
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kind of liking from concept is that of the good. This liking of the good is void of all 
feeling except the feeling of respect, and it is determined by reason. As a result, the 
universality of taste cannot be an objective universality, as in the case of cognitive 
claims and practical claims. It can only be a subjective universality; for one thing 
taste refers its claim to the subjective interactions of cognitive powers, yet this 
reference to the interactions of the subject goes beyond that particular subject and 
"extends... over the entire sphere ofjudging persons” (CJ, 59, V，215). That means 
the universality here is not referred to object cognised, but to the constitution of the 
subject's cognitive powers, which we as subjects all share. It is indeed the heart of 
the deduction of aesthetic judgement; however, I shall leave it behind first and 
proceed with the third moment. 
Third Moment: Taste as purposiveness without purpose 
The third moment of taste is about the ‘‘relation of purposes that is taken into 
consideration" (CJ, 64，V’ 219). Kant pointed out that purpose "is the object of a 
concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object's cause，’ (CJ, 64, V, 220). 
This might be an abstract way of presenting the concept of purpose, so we might 
explicate it with example. When we say that a pen is having a purpose of writing, 
what we mean is that the concept of writing determines the cause of a pen. The pen 
as an object is made in accordance with the concept of writing. We regard the 
causality between the concept of writing and the pen as purposive (CJ, 65, V, 220). 
However, Kant told us that there are ways for us to regard something purposive even 
i f they do not actually present a purpose. For example, we see this flat surface rock 
on the hi l l when we hike. We are so tired and we go over, sit on it and take a rest. 
The flat surface of this rock is very comfortable as i f it is a chair. We say, "Alas, 
what a comfortable chair here!" We judge the comfort of the rock with reference to a 
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purpose of sitting, as i f someone has made- that with such a flat surface for the 
comfort of sitting; however, we all know that it is natural and accidental. The rock 
does not in anyway present a real purpose; although we judge it in a purposive way. 
Therefore, from this example we can see that we are able to make this kind of 
judgement. Kant told us that beauty "is an object's form of purposiveness insofar as 
it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a purpose” (CJ, 84, V, 236). 
As for why the structure of aesthetic judgement is purposive, I find it 
appropriate to explain later in my account of the deduction of taste. However, a 
remark can be made at the moment about this purposiveness without a purpose. 
Whenever we present a purpose, we have a determinate concept of it. We have in the 
above mentioned that taste cannot be conceptual; hence it is natural that i f taste is 
structurally purposive, it cannot have a real purpose, or else it wi l l become a 
cognitive judgement. 
Fourth Moment: Taste as necessary liking 
The fourth moment of taste has to do with the modality of the liking. According to 
the categories of modality provided in the first Critique, they are namely the 
possibility, the existence, and the necessity. Kant told us that any presentation can 
possibly give rise to pleasure, while the existence of an agreeable object gives an 
actual pleasure. However, a beautiful object gives rise to a necessary liking (CJ, 85, 
V，236).Yet, this kind of necessity cannot be an objective one, for taste is not like 
cognitive and practical activities, which are determined by concepts. The necessity 
of taste gives rise to a feeling, which is universally valid and can be called a 
common sense (CJ, 87, V, 238). 
To sum up the analytic of aesthetic judgement, taste is disinterested, universal, 
Chapter Three 73 
purposive, and necessary. It is non-conceptual, and hence not cognitive, but yields 
only a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Nevertheless, it has a universal and 
necessary claim for everyone, although the universality and necessity of it is only 
subjective. Hence the issue at stake here is that when aesthetic judgement claims 
universality and necessity, it cannot have its basis in an empirical, psychological 
principle (CJ, 426-428, XX, 237-239). The basis underlying this judgement must 
refer to a priori principle. Yet, not like the principle of nature and freedom, this basis 
of taste is never conceptual. This special structure of taste makes its deduction a 
peculiar one, which I shall account in the following. 
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VI. Imagination, Harmony, and the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgement 
Kant before conducting the deduction of aesthetic judgement pointed out the two 
peculiarities of taste. These two peculiarities correspond to the results from the 
above discussed analytic of taste. The first peculiarity is the universality of taste. 
This universality makes it as i f having certain objectivity. 
A judgement of taste determines its object in respect of our 
l ik ing (beauty) [but] makes a claim to everyone 's assent, as 
i f it were an objective judgment. (CJ, 145, V, 281) 
However, as we have pointed out above, an objective judgement demands an 
application of concepts, and this would imply a reduction of taste to a cognitive 
judgement based on understanding or reason. Moreover, it is contradictory to say 
that a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which is an essential feature of taste, is 
itself conceptual. 74 Therefore this seeming objectivity of taste gives the first 
peculiarity. The second peculiarity is due to the necessity of taste. The necessity of 
taste, as it is not conceptual and cognitive, cannot be based on a proof. 
A judgment of taste, just as i f it were merely subjective, 
cannot be determined by bases of proof. (CJ, 147, V，284) 
This inability for us to prove the taste makes it having a seeming subjectivity. I f taste 
was merely subjective, then it would be senseless to talk about a deduction of it. Yet, 
on the other hand, its also seeming objectivity obliges us to provide a deduction (CJ, 
143, V, 280). Kant as a result told us that an objective principle of taste is impossible 
(CJ, 149，V，285)，and proceeded with the deduction with a "subjective principle of 
74 Of course, we can certainly have a conception of feelings, the work of articulating this feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure done by Kant can be seen as a way of forming a conception of feeling. 
However, feeling itself is something one must be able to sense (CJ, 411, XX, 223). It involves not 
merely a particular concept, for example, a concept of pleasure (for although we might understand 
well enough what this concept says, yet I do not feel the pleasure.), but a reflection on the relationship 
between our cognitive powers of imagination and understanding. See also CJ, 149, V，285f. 
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the power of judgement as such" (CJ, 150, V，286)7^ 
Kant thought that the deduction of aesthetic judgement hinges on the very 
power of judgement itself. The power of judgement, as mentioned in the beginning 
of this chapter, is the general ability to relate the particular with the universal. When 
we judge, certain conditions must be met in order to have the particulars subsumable 
under the corresponding universal. Hence, Kant wrote: 
The subjective condition of all judgments is our very ability 
to judge, i.e., the power of judgment. When we use this 
power of judgment in regard to a presentation by which an 
object is given, then it requires that there be a harmony 
between two presentational powers, imagination (for the 
intuition and the combination of its manifold) and 
understanding (for the concept that is the presentation of 
the unity of this combination). (CJ, 151，V，287) 
In order to understand this very condition of judgement, i.e. the harmony between 
the two cognitive power of imagination and understanding, it is necessary to go back 
to a reading of the first Critique. Kant in the "Schematism" of the first Critique 
accounted for this condition of subsuming the sensible intuition under the categories, 
and that procedure of subsuming requires a synthetic function of imagination. Hence, 
in the following I shall explicate the role of the synthesis of imagination upon the 
presentation of an object. After that, we can make better sense of the deduction of 
taste, which hinges on and makes reference to this procedure of schematism. 
One should note that the "subjectivity" of the principle of the power of judgement mentioned here 
takes a technical sense, which is entirely different from the "seeming subjectivity" mentioned above. 
The "seeming subjectivity" of taste is due to the inability for one to give an objective proof to 
aesthetic judgements. However, the "subjectivity" of the principle of the power of judgement refers to 
the subjective condition of judgement as such. The subjective condition means the special constitution 
of cognitive subjects, which I shall explain in the later part of this chapter concerning the deduction 
of taste. 
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Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason 
Described as "a blind but indispensable function of the soul" (CPR, A78/B103) the 
power of imagination {Einbildungskraft) is one of the most obscure concepts in 
Kant's philosophy. Different notions of imagination, from "transcendental synthesis 
of imagination," "transcendental function of imagination," "pure synthesis of 
imagination," to "productive imagination," are used by Kant frequently in the 
"Transcendental Analytic." Kant has also described the regulative idea of reason as a 
focus imaginarius (CPR, A644/B672), where according to the discussion of genius, 
is a result of the power of imagination freed from the law of association, creating 
another nature (CJ, 182，V，314). However, this sense of the power of imagination is 
not of immediate relevance here, and should be distinguished from the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination conceptually. ^^  The transcendental 
synthesis of imagination, which renders the subsumption of sensible intuition under 
understanding possible, should be our focus here; as it is this sense of the power of 
imagination which makes up the condition of judgement as such. It is in the chapter 
of “Schematism’，where Kant gave an account of this problem. 
The chapter of the "Schematism" starts with the concern of the application of 
the categories, which Kant termed as a problem of transcendental judgement 
{transscendentale Urtheilskraft) (CPR, A132/B171). To specify the instances of the 
application of the categories is basically the aim of the chapter of "Schematism." It 
is a chapter discussing the universal condition of application of the categories to 
sensibly given objects (CPR, A140/B179). The forms of the power of sensibility, i.e. 
space and time, are seemingly heterogeneous with the forms of the power of 
understanding, i.e. the categories, with the former being sensible and passive, while 
76 For a thorough discussion of different conceptions of imagination used by Kant, see Rudolf A. 
Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of 
Judgment, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990)，pp. 9-25. 
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the latter being intellectual and spontaneous. Upon the procedure of the application 
of the categories, there must be a "third thing" (CPR, A138/B177) mediating the two 
heterogeneous forms and Kant ascribed that to the transcendental schema {ibid.). 
Kant himself upon discussing the matter used examples of the subsumption and 
schematism of the empirical and mathematical concepts, which I shall explain in the 
following. 
Kant started the chapter by analysing the subsumption of objects under 
concepts, suggesting that all subsumptions require the object subsumed to be 
homogeneous with the corresponding concept (CPR, A137/B176). In the application 
of empirical concepts, a certain kind of “image，，is needed. He used the example of 
the mathematical concept of a triangle to demonstrate his point and the procedure of 
schematism in general. He suggested that no image is adequate to exhibit 
(darstellen)” the concept of triangle as a universal upon judging, but only the 
schemata in thought can help in judging, i.e. subsuming (CPR, A 141/B180). In 
addition to that, an "image" in a form of schema of a four legs animal provided to 
our mind by imagination exhibits the empirical concept of a "dog" (ibid.); and again 
no image of any particular dog would be adequate upon such exhibition 
{Darstellung). 
Fred L. Rush, Jr. in his paper suggests that Kant's understanding of Darstellung 
involves "the various ways in which the imagination constructs or displays rules in 
intuition for the benefits of the cognitive undertakings;" and that it is a "necessary 
stage in the preparation for application of any concept to a manifold of intuition 
because any such application requires the concept to be associated with its possible 
77 Darstellen, a concept of Kant pointed out in the paper of Rush, Jr.，"The Harmony of the 
Faculties," pp. 45-46; moreover in Pluhar's translation of the Critique the translator has pointed out 
that darstellen as a technical concept of Kant should be translated as "to exhibit" instead of the 
traditional translation of "to present，” refer to CPR, A142/B181 n.87 and Bxvii n.73. Details of the 
concept wil l be discussed momentarily. 
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instances.，，78 I think these interpretations summarize the concept of Darstellung in a 
technical sense nicely, as it is a matter of association of the concepts with its 
possible instances by means of an exhibition as schema in thought. The exhibition of 
concepts as an “image” must on one hand provide the mind with its conceptual 
content., for instance, the &o%ness of the concept of a "dog"; on the other hand such 
exhibition must be in a homogeneous manner with the object, i.e. the particular dog. 
Such procedure is indeed subtle, and its origin is described by Kant as "a secret art 
residing in the depths of the human soul" (CPR, A141/B180f.)； however, I shall in 
the following explicate this procedure. 
The procedure of the above mentioned exhibition can be explained with 
examples. For instance, when an animal present in front of me with me possessing in 
my mind numerous of concepts of animal, a synthesis of imagination must proceed 
in order to exhibit the content of different concepts I have for animals as schemata. 
Only as schemata the content of the concepts can be brought harmonious to the 
particular animal present; without such a step, the concepts remain as formal rules 
that can never be associated harmoniously with the particulars presented in our 
sensible intuition. To make sense of this point, one could reflect that we all probably 
possess this empirical concept of a "dog," however we can never adequately express 
the full content of this concept; no image or proposition would adequately express 
such concept, and all we can do is referring to a particular, be it an image or a real 
dog. This act of reference is the exhibition of the concept's content in our thought in 
a harmonious fashion with the particular object presented in our mind, in order to 
compare such exhibition as schema of the concept with the particular; and such 
procedure of exhibition is by means of a synthesis of imagination, with its product as 
schema mediating the concepts as universals and the particulars. Only upon such a 
78 Rush, Jr., "The Harmony of the Faculties," pp. 45-46. 
Chapter Three 79 
procedure can we make judgments, i.e. determining whether a particular object can 
be subsumed under a concept. It is this peculiar power of Einbildungskraft, which 
being formative while productive, that makes the production of schemata possible. 
One can see that, the exhibition of the content of the concepts requires a power to 
form schema in thought. Moreover, the schema formed is not in the strictest sense 
reproductive but productive, as no images or presented objects can serve adequately 
as an exhibition. 
The same procedure applies to the pure concept of understanding. As the 
categories are pure, meaning that no empirical instances of them can be provided to 
the mind, therefore the transcendental schemata that make possible the subsumption 
of the categories are inevitably different to their empirical counterparts. The 
transcendental schemata are transcendental determinations of time by means of the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination. The content of the categories can only be 
instantiated, or exhibited in the mind, through a reference to the pure form of time. 
As pure concepts of understanding, categories stand as formal rules of our minds; 
79 Norman Kemp Smith in his translation of the first Critique followed Vaihinger's substitution of the 
word produktiven with reproduktiven in the first sentence of the page B181, which reads: 
This much only we can assert: the image is a product of the 
empirical faculty of reproductive (the substituted word) 
imagination... (A141/B181) 
Such a substitution would make it sounds like that Kant thought that the "image" provided in 
empirical concepts' application is a reproduction of imagination. I do not think that that makes any 
sense to Kant's flow of argument there. Kant was surely not discussing the reproductive power of 
imagination there; he was actually discussing about how the empirical concept of "dog" is to be 
applicable to a particular dog. He was saying that a shape of a "four-footed animal in a general way" 
(CPR, A141/B180), which is not limited “to any single and particular shape offered to me by 
experience" (ibid.), is needed for the application of the concept of "dog." As a result, the "image" 
Kant had in mind must be a production, instead of a reproduction, of imagination. Pluhar translated 
that directly from the Akademie edition, which reads: 
Only this much can we say: The image is [here] a product of the 
productive imagination's empirical ability. {So viel konnen wir 
nur sagen: das Bild ist ein Product des empirischen Vermogens 
der productiven Einbildungskraft...) (CPR, A141/B181) 
This reading of the translation could go together with the interpretation of the text I provided above. 
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they determine the operation of the faculty of understanding towards presentations, 
i.e. they serve as rules of understanding. By their functions alone they signify only 
the "mere unity of presentations" (CPR, A147/B186) and they are "given no object, 
and hence also no signification that could yield a concept of the object" (CPR, 
A147/B186). Moreover, they would be 'Void of all content" and become "mere 
logical forms" instead of pure concepts of understanding (CPR, A136/B175). The 
reason for Kant to have proposed the pure form time as a candidate as the third thing 
is that, time is on one hand homogeneous with appearance, as "every empirical 
presentation of the manifold contains time" (CPR, A138f./B177f.), while on the 
other hand, time is "homogeneous with the category (in which its unity consists) 
insofar the time determination is universal and rests on an a priori rule" (ibid.). It is 
because, according to the "Transcendental Aesthetic," "time has only one 
dimension，’ (CPR, A31/B47). This unity of time� fits harmoniously with the 
unifying function of understanding by means of categories. The transcendental 
synthesis of imagination, on one hand, brings the form of time forwards as an 
instance upon exhibiting the content of categories; while on the other hand, makes 
the implicit unity of the form of time explicit in the mind through a determination in 
accordance with the rules of categories. This determination of time hence makes 
possible the subsumption of sensible intuition under the pure concepts of 
understanding. 
From the above analysis, we can see that upon taking up objects in intuition, 
imagination determines the form of time in accordance with the rules of 
understanding. The procedure of schematism brings a harmony to the two cognitive 
powers (CJ, 151，V’ 287), which are necessary components of cognition; and this is 
80 Refer to Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 162-163; where the author refers the "unity 
of time" as a necessary condition of human cognition. 
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the SO called "subjective condition of all judgments" mentioned in the deduction of 
taste {ibid.). In what follows I shall go back to the problem of the deduction itself. 
Deduction of taste 
Aesthetic judgement lays claims on everyone's assent as a necessary liking; hence it 
has a universal validity, although the universality bases not on concept. We are 
obliged to provide a deduction whenever there is a universal claim, be it objective or 
merely subjective (CJ, 143，V, 280). In the case of taste, it is “the universal validity” 
(CJ, 154, V，289) of the feeling of pleasure that is asserted having a priori 
universality. I wi l l first explain how this feeling of pleasure arises，and then follows 
with the explanation of its universality based on the subjective condition of 
judgement. That would finish the task of a deduction of taste. 
Upon cognition of an object, imagination and understanding cooperate with 
each other, while imagination determines the forms of intuition according to the 
rules of categories. It seems that imagination is not free but being merely a servant 
of the understanding; however, Kant pointed out that certain objects may possess 
certain forms, where the combination and design of the manifolds in it are arranged 
in a unified way that is required by the lawfulness of understanding (CJ, 91, V， 
240f.). For example, when we call a piece of baroque music beautiful, we appeal to 
the unity it provides out of its variations. Throughout the variation of a piece of 
music, there is a theme (unity) guiding the development of the variations. The unity 
here, as Henrich formulated, is the "conditions of a possible conceptualization in 
general.，，8i These forms, where the spatial and temporal arrangements in them 
present certain lawfulness, are what we usually call beautiful forms. When 
81 Dieter Henrich, Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant, (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1992)，p. 49. 
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imagination apprehends this kind of objects, it is as i f imagination does not need to 
conform to the lawfulness of the understanding, because the forms of the object 
already possess such lawfulness. Imagination seems to be free upon this harmony 
with the lawfulness of understanding {ibid.), as the requirement of lawfulness of 
understanding is "fulfilled without coercion.，’82 
Furthermore, this form of the beautiful object is purposive subjectively, 
meaning that the form is seemed to be arranged in accordance with the required 
harmony for judgement. Yet, the purposiveness is actually without a purpose, as the 
mutual harmony is not determined by any concept, but the condition of judgement 
itself. This harmony of the cognitive powers gives rise to a feeling of pleasure, when 
we "consider understanding and imagination as they relate to each other" (CJ, 411, 
XX, 223). Henrich used an example of dancing partner to explain this point 
beautifully: 
The play can thus be compared to a dance of two partners 
who harmonize in their movements without influencing 
each other and who enjoy their joint performance.^^ 
Beautiful object provides imagination with a form that possesses certain lawfulness, 
which harmonize with understanding's requirement of unity. Hence, imagination's 
work of apprehension is not in this case forced by understanding. Upon the 
cognition of the object, both cognitive powers proceed freely, yet harmoniously; and 
this harmony gives rise to aesthetic pleasure, as we perceive the purposiveness of the 
object for our cognitive powers. I shall cite in full the following passage, which Kant 
explicated the above points: 
82 Ibid.，p. 51. 
83 Ibid., p. 52. 
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So i f the form of an object given in empirical intuition is of 
such a character that the apprehension, in the imagination, 
of the object's manifold agrees with the exhibition of a 
concept of the understanding (which concept this is being 
indeterminate), then imagination and understanding a re~ in 
mere r e f l e c t i o n i n mutual harmony, a harmony that 
furthers the task of these powers; and the object is 
perceived as purposive, [though] purposive merely for 
judgment. Hence we then consider the purposiveness itself 
as merely subjective; by the same token, this 
[purposiveness] neither requires nor produces a determinate 
concept of the object, and the judgment itself is not a 
cognitive one. (CJ, 409，XX, 221) 
Moreover, we should never forget that taste takes a structure of reflective judgement. 
The pleasure from the free harmony between imagination and understanding is due 
to reflective judgement's comparing of the state of the two cognitive powers (CJ, 
41 I f . XX，223). 
This is basically the structure of the reflective aesthetic judgement. As for the 
problem of its universal validity, and hence the deduction of taste, Kant indeed 
thought that it is an easy task (CJ, 156，V, 290). It is because as long as we have 
explicated the basis of aesthetic judgement as the subjective condition of power of 
judgement as such, we can adequately deduce the universality of aesthetic 
judgement, as the very subjective condition of judgement is the condition of 
possibility of cognition for everyone (CJ, 155, V，290). As long as everyone is 
conditioned by this structure of judgement for cognition, in other words, upon all 
possible cognition the procedure of judging is necessary, the above structure of 
aesthetic judgement must be valid for everyone. As a result, this universality of taste 
is only subjective, in the sense that it is grounded in the condition of judgement in 
cognitive subject; nevertheless, this ground lays claim to all cognitive subjects. 
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Although some of the earlier studies have suggested that the deduction of taste 
should not end here and should extend to Kant's account of the relationship between 
taste and morality, which is a part of the "Dialectic" of taste,84 i do not think it is the 
right occasion to tackle this problem. I wil l show in chapter three that the dialectic of 
taste points to another problem separable from that of the deduction; that would 
indirectly answer to the above suggestion made by the early studies. 
In the following chapter, I shall go back to the problems formulated in chapter 
one and the beginning of this chapter. The two problems are, first, how reflective 
judgement contributes to the systematic cognition of nature, and second, how 
reflective judgement could possibly deal with the systematic problem of 
transcendental philosophy, which requires a transition to the supersensible. 
84 One of the well known studies which suggested this point is a book written by a famous Kantian 
scholar Donald W. Crawford, see his Kant's Aesthetic Theory, (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1974). 
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VII. Concluding Remarks to the Chapter 
I have in this chapter formulated the proper subject matter of the third Critique, 
namely, the reflective power of judgement. I have also outlined the two problems 
that can be solved through an account of this reflective power of judgement; they are 
the problem of experience as a system and the systematic problem of Kantian 
philosophy. In the rest of the chapter, I interpreted Kant's account of aesthetic 
judgement as the subjective use of reflective power of judgement. Through an 
analysis and deduction of the aesthetic judgement, Kant showed us that we have a 
certain kind of reflective activity, for which the principle is grounded in itself. This 
opened up a realm of philosophical reflection beyond the theoretical part and the 
practical part of philosophy, which might in the end unify the two parts in a 
systematic fashion. How this could be done is the central theme of next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Reflective Judgement and the Supersensible Substrate 
,，In der Idee leben heisst das Unmogliche 
so behandeln als wenn es moglich ware." 
Goethe, Spruche in Prosa 
I. Introduction 
In the above chapter I have explicated the structure of aesthetic judgement and the 
deduction of its a priori principle. Upon a philosophical investigation of the 
reflective power of judgement Kant thematized aesthetic judgement because it 
"reveals itself as a power that has its own principle" (CJ, 434，XX, 244). The 
principle of reflective judgement is the technic, or the purposiveness, of nature. In 
the case of the aesthetic judgement, the purposiveness as principle of judgement is a 
subjective kind. The subjective purposiveness of nature as the transcendental 
principle of judgement is then deduced to have its basis in the very power of 
judgement itself. The strategy of Kant's account of the reflective power of 
judgement is hence like this: first, he thematized one single kind of human activity 
that would unveil the heautonomy (CJ, 414, XX, 225) of the power of judgement, 
and i.e. taste. Upon showing this he could then show that there is a certain kind of 
reflective activity that has a priori basis, which is not reducible to understanding and 
reason. Moreover, this kind of reflective activity of human beings would eventually 
shed light on our systematic presentation of nature and of transcendental philosophy. 
For the former problem, Kant gave an account in the second part of the third 
Critique, which dealt with the teleological judgement. Teleological judgement is a 
kind of reflective judgement that refers the purposiveness of nature to the concept of 
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reason (CJ, 248, V, 370). This reference to the concept of reason, which is a 
causality of purpose {ibid.), is analogical, and hence is reflective (CJ, 236, V’ 360). 
As a result, it is appropriate in the following account to explicate the concept of 
analogy, where Kant dealt with in the last part of the dialectic of aesthetic judgement. 
After that we can have a better understanding of how we judge reflectively nature as 
a teleological system, which Kant thought to be necessarily inherent in natural 
science (CJ, 261, V，381). 
Besides solving the problem of the basis of empirical laws, both aesthetic and 
teleological judgement point to the problem of Kant's system of philosophy. I have 
set forth in the above chapters that there must be a certain kind of transition towards 
the supersensible elements of our cognition in order for Kant to bring systematic 
unity to transcendental philosophy. I wi l l in the following show that the problem of 
the supersensible substrate is also an internal problem of the reflective power of 
judgement, which Kant accounted for, again, with the theoretical device of antinomy. 
A reading of how Kant accounted for the antinomy of teleology wil l be necessary for 
us to see how Kant could bring a possible transition towards the supersensible 
substrate, which under the framework of reflective power of judgement, would unify 
transcendental philosophy in a certain way. 
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II. Analogy and Teleological Judgement 
There have not been too many systematic studies on Kant's concept of teleological 
judgement, at least not in the English speaking community of Kantian scholarship. 
Two leading American Kantian scholars, Henry Allison and Paul Guyer, have both 
published a monograph addressing the third Critique; however, they both limited 
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their studies on the part of critique of taste. Allison pointed out that in order to 
appreciate Kant's interesting view on biological science, which is an important topic 
intertwined with the notion of teleological judgement, one must have sufficient 
expertise in the philosophy and the history of biology.^^ I do think that Allison's 
comment on this issue is utterly important and sound, as without a good knowledge 
of the philosophy and the history of science, one would give a superficial account of 
the notion teleological judgement with reference to natural science. As in the case of 
the critique of aesthetic judgement, which I intentionally would prevent from going 
into in depth discussion of its implications on aesthetics/theory of taste, I wil l here 
also limit my account of the teleological judgement and not go into in depth 
discussion of its implication on the philosophy of science. For one thing, it is due to 
my lack of knowledge in the philosophy of science, for another, I think it would be 
wise for me to focus on the systematic problem I set forth, namely, the need of a 
transition towards the supersensible for the sake of systematic unity of 
transcendental philosophy. Hence, both my accounts of the two kinds of reflective 
87 
judgement are confined to that concern. 
85 I am here referring to Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)，and Paul Guyer, 
Kant and the Claim of Taste, second edition, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
^^  Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste, p. 6f. 
87 Allison pointed out that there are several studies whose authors are better equipped in the topic of 
biological science. They are Peter McLaughlin, Kant's Critique of Teleology in Biological 
Explanation, J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, Clark Zumbach, The Transcendental 
Science, and Klaus Diising, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff. There are also several articles 
discussing Kant's notion of teleological judgement I have gathered during my research, which 1 have 
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I wi l l in this section discuss how Kant thought that reflective teleological 
judgement could bring about the systematic unity of nature, which he thought to be 
necessary for natural science. I do not want to evaluate this topic; however, this 
should serve as a preparation for my discussion of how the supersensible emerges as 
an internal problem of reflective judgement. To give a teleological explanation of 
nature, Kant thought, would be referring nature to "something supersensible" (CJ, 
258, V，378). However, the only reality we can provide for this supersensible of 
nature, which is presupposed as the basis for the possibility of all objects of 
experience (CJ, 14，V，175)，is the "practical reality" {ibid). Kant thought that this 
peculiarity of our connection to the supersensible, where we assume supersensible in 
nature and understand it through an analogy of our practice, is an act of reflective 
judgement. Hence, through reflective judgement we can properly unify the practical 
supersensible and the assumed theoretical supersensible in a supersensible substrate 
that we point to (CJ, 214，V，341). I wil l , as a result, first explicate Kant's conception 
of analogy, which shall help us understand better the analogical reflective judging of 
nature as teleological system. 
Analogy as reflective judgement 
Kant stated clearly in the introduction to the second part of the third Critique that 
teleological judging is by analogy and therefore is reflective. The passage reads: 
Yet we are right to bring teleological judging into our 
investigation of nature, at least problematically, but only i f 
we do this so as to bring nature under principles of 
observation and investigation by analogy with the causality 
in terms of purposes, without presuming to explain it in 
terms of that causality. Hence teleological judging is 
included in my bibliography for reference. 
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reflective, not determinative. (CJ, 236, V’ 360) 
Judgement brings reason's concept of purpose (CJ, 248, V，370) into the 
investigation of nature through analogy, which the concept is never to be used 
determinatively but only reflectively. The concept of analogy, however, was 
explicated by Kant way back to the last part of the critique of aesthetic judgement, a 
section entitled “On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality." Although this section on the 
relationship between beauty and morality has been a heavily studied section for 
those scholars who concern themselves with that relationship, I wi l l only draw on 
the concept of analogy there and leave the discussion of the above relationship for 
other occasion. I wi l l also refer to the Prize Essay, where thorough discussion of the 
concept of analogy is also found. 
It is indeed the most famous doctrine of Kant that cognition is real only i f there 
are instances given in intuition for the concept of an object (CJ, 225, V’ 351). The 
only possible human cognition is that of the sensible; hence to have instances given 
in intuition for a concept is to make a concept sensible, the procedure which I have 
mentioned in the last chapter as exhibition (Darstellung) (CJ, 226, V, 351). The 
exhibition of a concept can either be schematic or symbolic (ibid.). The schematic 
exhibition is the procedure of schematism I have mentioned in last chapter. However, 
when there is a concept where no adequate intuition as instance can be given, for 
example, the concepts of reason, a symbolic exhibition can still be possible. It works 
in the following way: 
[...]this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgment 
treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows 
in schematizing, i.e., the treatment agrees with this 
procedure merely in the rule followed rather than in terms 
of the intuition itself, and hence merely in terms of the form 
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of the reflection rather than its content. (CJ, 226, V, 351) 
Kant used an example to illustrate his point. He said that we can say that a monarchy 
ruled by an absolutist is like a hand mill. Here we would never think that what the 
speaker is expressing is the similarity of appearance between the two. What the 
speaker is talking about is the similarity of their operation between the two (CJ, 227, 
V，352). We get to understand this metaphor through a reflection on how the hand 
mil l operates and comparing that with the way an absolutist rules the monarchy. 
Obviously, the absolutist does not wind his country in the way a man winds his hand 
mil l ; however, as we lack an example to express the mechanism of absolutism (for 
when we refer the ruling method of an absolutist to another absolutist, we are only 
pointing to another example of absolutist, but not expressing absolutism itself) we 
need to use another object as a symbol. We know well enough the mechanistic 
character of a hand mill, which included the mechanistic character, and use it as a 
symbol to express the character of absolutism as mechanistic. This is indeed a 
process of reflective judgement, where we reflect on an object (hand mill), then 
transfer that reflection to an "entirely different concept, to which perhaps no 
intuition can ever directly correspond" (CJ, 228, V，352f.). 
In the Prize Essay, Kant directly pointed out that symbolization of concept is 
“an expedient for concepts of the super-sensible" (PE, 370，XX, 279). There he even 
used the example of natural objects such as animals and plants, where we attribute 
their organization to a maker, as in the case of a clock and its maker {ibid., 370’ XX, 
280). Although we do not know anything about this maker of the organisms, we can 
still analogically understand the relationship between him/her and the organisms 
through the symbol of a clock. This is indeed what Kant has said about our 
teleological judging with reference to nature. 
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Teleological Judgement: Between mechanism and purposiveness 
In the first Critique Kant has accounted for the conditions of possibility of 
experience, where causality between events is transcendentally grounded. Nature, 
where in its sum total the sensible objects are causally connected, is merely 
mechanistic in this sense. Allison has pointed out that at least in the context of the 
third Critique, mechanism of nature means "the explanation of wholes solely in 
terms of the causal interaction of their component parts."^^ He referred to the 
following passage where Kant characterized the concept: 
When we consider a material whole as being, in terms of its 
form, a product o f its parts and of their forces and powers 
for combining in their own (to which we must add other 
matter that the parts supply to one another), then our 
presentation is of a whole produced mechanically. (CJ, 293, 
V，408) 
We can explicate this point in the following way. The universal concept of nature 
Kant provided in the first Critique, where it forms a system in terms of 
transcendental laws, only proves that we can legitimately perceive all events of 
nature as causally connected. However, how they are connected is entirely 
contingent. Whether A causes B then C, or the other way around, A cause C then B, 
there is no rule to follow. In the end, the sum total of these events lack a determined 
totality, as it is constituted by the contingent connections among the parts. As a 
result, it is as Kant has said, that the whole is a product of its parts; and it is what he 
meant by mechanistic. In this sense, nature as experience does not properly form a 
systematic whole, as the sum total is constituted by contingency. I have mentioned 
88 Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Antinomy of Teleological Judgment," in Kant's Critique of the Power of 
Judgment: Critical Essays, Paul Guyer ed.，(Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. Inc., 2003), p. 221. 
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in the last chapter, that i f the real content of nature did not form a system in some 
way, then we would search in vain for lawfulness among empirical objects, which 
would then be merely products of a blind mechanism; and empirical laws and 
concepts would be impossible. From a mechanistic point of view, all the 
arrangements among natural objects are contingent, as there is no idea of a whole 
that can give unity to these arrangements; and from such a point of view, empirical 
lawfulness can never be found among natural objects. 
However, it is a fact that we do possess empirical concepts and laws, and that 
we presupposed these upon our investigation of nature. Upon this presupposition we 
think that nature has a purposive structure, that “Nature does nothing in vain'' (CJ, 
399，XX, 210). To think nature as purposive is to think that, first, “the possibility of 
its parts (as concern their existence and their form) must depend on their relation to 
the whole" (CJ, 252, V，373). It is contrary to a mechanistic view of nature, where 
the relationship between the part and the whole is the other way round. This would 
mean that nature as whole has a determined concept or idea {ibid) how things are to 
be arranged within its system. ^^  Second, within this determined whole the 
possibility of parts has a mutual, reciprocal causality within the whole {ibid). In 
such a system, “each part exists only as a result of all the rest, so we also think of 
each part as existing/or the sake of the others and of the whole" (CJ, 253, V’ 373). 
89 One should note that, however, from the mechanism Kant established in the first Critique, a 
transcendental lawfulness is already proved. I have in the second section of last chapter showed that 
understanding constitutes a system of transcendental laws, where the lawful use of causality that 
makes possible a thorough connection of objects is established. The empirical lawfulness mentioned 
here, however, requires that the whole of nature can be somehow determined; the form of empirical 
objects must be able to harmonize generically to give a systematic whole. Only through that can we 
establish the lawfulness of empirical laws and sciences. 
卯 My thesis supervisor has used an example of the difference between library as a system and a 
badly managed second-hand bookshop as an aggregate to illustrate this point in various lectures; and 
this point is made in one of his Chinese article concerning the problem of system. See 關子尹著： 
«•“系統”問題的宏觀省察』系統視野與宇宙人生》增訂版，陳天機、許傳雲、關子尹主編 ’ 
香港：商務印書館 ’ 二〇〇二，頁六。 [Tze-wan, Kwan, "Some General Remarks on System 
Thinking," In System Perspectives on Universe and Life, Chen Tien Chi, Hsu Cho-yun and Kwan 
Tze-wan ed., (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1999), p. 6.] 
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Only upon such a presupposition we can think of why particular natural objects must 
be arranged in such and such manners in relation to each other; and it is the basis for 
us to derive a holistic system of empirical laws and concepts. 
Now the problem remains as to how this "whole" of nature is to be addressed 
and in what sense it is purposive. The latter problem I wil l address after the former, 
as it is related to the emergence of the supersensible in reflective judgement. 
I have mentioned many times before, that this whole of nature is a 
presupposition and can only be perceived analogically. It is because the only 
legitimate cognition Kant had grounded in the first Critique was that of the 
mechanistic one. Any cognition of the whole of nature, as we have seen in the 
antinomies, is illusive. As a result, i f we introduce a concept of the whole as a 
determined concept of nature into our cognition, it would certainly be false. Yet, it 
seems that at least a presupposition of this whole as purposive is necessary as a 
‘‘special kind of causality" (CJ, 236, V，359). Kant told us that we actually "slip the 
concept of a purpose into the nature of things" (ibid.�, because the purposiveness of 
nature is neither ours nor nature's own (CJ, 235, V, 359). We cannot directly apply 
the concept of the purposiveness of our practice, which belongs to reason, to nature; 
on the other hand, any theoretical cognition of the purpose of nature would be false. 
Therefore, what we actually do is grasping this presupposed purposiveness with an 
analogy from the purposiveness of our practice. 
One might inquire into why this analogical understanding of the purposiveness 
of nature must refer to the purposiveness of human practice. This issue could be 
explained in the following way. In a holistic system of nature we presupposed there 
is a determined concept or idea which determines how the parts are to be arranged. It 
is in this sense that a system is purposive (as in the two points mentioned above) as 
the parts are so arranged for the whole: 
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To say that a thing is possible only as a purpose is to say 
that the causality that gave rise to it must be sought, not in 
the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose ability to act 
is determined by concepts. (CJ, 248, V，369) 
The only ability that we know, which acts in accordance with concepts, is a wil l (CJ, 
248, V，370). I have pointed out in the first chapter that a will, which acts in 
accordance with the concept of reason, acts with the totality and necessity in view. 
In the purposive whole of nature we presupposed, different parts are arranged in 
accordance with the concept of the whole with necessity {ibid.). Therefore, we can 
only understand this wholeness and necessity of nature's presupposed purposiveness 
through an analogy referring to our own practice, "as i f it had come about through a 
causality that only reason can have” {ibid.). We base our presupposition of nature's 
purposiveness on this analogy, taking nature as i f having its will. 
We have now a better understanding of the meaning of the purposiveness of 
nature as a concept of the whole. However, there is an obvious problem. Throughout 
the above discussion, I have been very careful about adding the words 
"presupposed" and "presupposition" in my reference to the purposive wholeness of 
nature. The so called determined concept of the whole of nature is actually 
indeterminate, as it can neither be taken as given in nature nor as truly our own. 
What we have actually done is doing "some subtle reasoning and merely slip the 
concept of purpose into the nature of things" (CJ, 236, V’ 359). Hence, this 
purposiveness of nature can never be in a true sense taken as a purpose of nature 
itself. It does not constitute experience as such (CJ, 408, XX，219). Kant told us that 
“ i t is actually the power of judgment that is technical" (CJ, 408，XX, 220). The 
technic of judgement is the basis of the idea of a technic of nature (CJ, 407, XX, 
219). It is due to certain peculiarity of human cognitive power, where our power of 
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judgment is technical, that we present nature as purposive. This is one of the 
problems Kant accounted for in the antinomy of teleological judgement, where the 
problem of supersensible is addressed as well. I wil l in the following discuss this 
issue. 
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III. Intuitive Understanding and the Supersensible Substrate of Reality 
In the above discussion we saw that it is seemingly necessary for us to introduce the 
concept of purposiveness of nature into our perception of nature, in order to render 
possible empirical laws and concepts. However, Kant thought that the concept of 
purposiveness of nature cannot be a constitutive principle of experience; the only 
legitimate constitutive principles of experience are those of the understanding, 
which yield only mechanical laws. I f we introduce the concept of purposiveness as a 
constitutive principle of experience, then an antinomy of reason would result (CJ, 
267，V, 387). The thesis of this antinomy, which reads: "A l l production of material 
things is possible in terms of merely mechanical laws" {ibid.) cannot be proved with 
certainty. It is because a mere mechanism of nature cannot explain, or ground, our 
percept ion of organised beings (CJ, 269，V，389). I f the thesis of this antinomy is to 
have unlimited universality, then all our perceptions of empirical laws and concepts 
have to be false, or at least groundless, because there is not systematic whole that 
would guide our search for the empirical lawfulness of natural objects. Kant said 
thus: 
But [judgment does need a special principle of reflection] 
for the particular laws, the laws that only experience can 
reveal to us, and so in their case judgment must serve itself 
as a principle. For the particular laws of nature can be so 
very diverse and heterogeneous that, without such a 
principle to guide it, judgment could not even search for 
and spot a law in the appearances of nature, and so could 
even hope to reach a coherent empirical cognition based on 
a thorough lawfulness of nature, i.e., on the unity of nature 
in terms of empirical laws. (CJ, 267, W , 386) 
Hence, we can see that this mechanism of nature cannot be taken with unlimited 
universality, or else it wi l l treat the empirical lawfulness of nature. 
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On the other hand, the antithesis, which reads: "Some production of material 
things is not possible in terms of merely mechanical laws" (CJ, 267, V, 387) cannot 
be proved either. We have no legitimate theoretical cognition of nature besides that 
of a mechanistic one grounded in the first Critique. We have no true insight into the 
basis of the purposiveness of nature, as it is "contingent for us since we cognize 
them only empirically，，(CJ, 269, V，388). The basis of the purposiveness of nature 
can never be proved with certainty, as the constitutive principles of our cognition, i.e. 
those of our understanding, has to wait for the given from sensible intuition. As a 
result，any seeming purposiveness of nature perceived must be contingent to us. As I 
mentioned before, our laws of understanding let us differentiate and connect the 
objects of our experience in a mechanical way. They establish that certain object 
must be an effect of certain cause, without determining which particular cause is the 
cause of certain effect. Therefore, our empirical cognition of objects of nature is 
contingent in this sense. The principle of purposiveness of nature must be something 
supersensible {ibid.), which we cannot have any cognition of. To sum up, i f we take 
the above theses as determinative judgements that constitute our experience, we 
would be contradicting ourselves. This would be enough to prove that our taking of 
these theses as determinative judgements as false (CJ, 269, V，389). 
Kant thought that it would be an entirely different situation i f we take the above 
theses as maxims of reflective power of judgement (CJ, 266，V’ 386). Although these 
theses taken as maxims still have their contents conflicted with each other, the 
maxims merely told us to reflect upon nature in two different ways. The thesis, when 
converted to maxim, merely told us to reflect upon nature with reference to 
mechanical laws (CJ, 268, V，387). It is only upon how we see nature, but not as 
how nature constituted, that we use this maxim of mechanism. On the other hand, 
the antithesis converted to maxim told us to reflect upon nature with reference to 
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purposiveness beyond mere mechanism (CJ, 268, V, 388). I f it is not possible for us 
to see nature in this way, all empirical laws and concepts would be impossible. The 
important thing Kant was trying to point out is that these two theses are compatible 
in a sense i f we use them to reflect on nature, not but i f we use them as constitutive 
principles of experience (CJ, 269，V, 389). It is a problem of how we see in a 
reflective fashion, instead of how nature is constituted in itself. 
Seeing the problem in this way allows us to understand why the conflict 
between the maxims is natural. The conflict between the maxim has its basis " in the 
nature of our cognitive powers’，(CJ, 266, V，386). The nature of our cognitive power 
has certain peculiarity (CJ, 288，V，405), in that our reflective power of judgement 
proceeds technically. This technic of the power of judgement renders possible our 
technical presentation of nature. Moreover, it refers our power of judgement to a 
supersensible substrate, which is the main theme of my thesis. 
The peculiarity of human cognitive power 
The strategy for Kant to show that the concept of technic of nature can be 
legitimately introduced into our investigation of nature is through proving that it is a 
peculiarity of our power of judgement to be technical. He wrote: 
Nature is presented as technical only insofar as it 
harmonizes with, and [so] necessitates, that [technical] 
procedure of judgment. (CJ, 408，XX, 220) 
Our technical procedure of judgement is that we analogically perceive nature as 
having a “supreme cause that acts intentionally” (CJ, 281, V, 399). Yet, we can never 
have any determinate cognition of this supreme cause; it is only because we cannot 
possibly explain the organized nature that we need to presuppose this cause (ibid.). I 
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wi l l in the following explicate this peculiarity of our cognitive power. 
In the above I have pointed out that the concept of purposiveness of nature as a 
whole can only be a concept of reason, since reason "aims at the unconditioned" (CJ, 
283, V, 401) and has totality and necessity in its view. However, as we have pointed 
out in the first chapter, reason's concept cannot be used to constitute any cognition, 
but can only in its theoretical use regulate the use of understanding (CJ, 284, V，401). 
In other words, as I have pointed out many times before, our understanding can 
never have insight into the purposive wholeness of nature directly. Yet, reason 
demands that a determined concept of the whole as unconditioned necessity (CJ, 285， 
V，402) is to be found. Human understanding can never meet this demand, as it is 
always conditioned to the given. The condition of depending on givenness for reality 
is the first peculiarity of human understanding and hence it is discursive (CJ, 284, V， 
402); Kant thought that i f it is the case, then it is at least possible for us to think of 
another kind of understanding, where it is not conditioned by givenness. Such kind 
of understanding wi l l have nothing contingent (CJ, 286, V，403)，as it does not 
depend on the givenness for reality. This kind of understanding is called "an intuitive 
understanding" (CJ, 290, V，406). It is intuitive because it does not have to wait for 
the given (as receptivity) for reality, but it has “a power of complete spontaneity [as 
opposed to receptivity] of intuition” (ibid.). At this point it is wise to compare the 
two kinds of understanding, namely, the discursive, human kind and the intuitive 
kind, in order to explicate the idea of an intuitive understanding. 
Kant told us that because human cognition "require[s] two quite heterogeneous 
components，’ (CJ, 284, V，401), namely, the pure concept of understanding and the 
intuition of sensibility, it is necessary for us to distinguish between possibility and 
actuality. We call an object possible when it is possible for us to present it in thought, 
with the use of concepts (CJ, 285, V’ 402). However, when we say that an object is 
Chapter Three lo i 
actual, it is demanded that the object is given through sensibility. This is the 
meaning of discursity of our understanding. Kant thought that a discursive 
understanding is the one that is conceptual (CJ, 284, V，402), because we are 
dependent on the given materials from sensible intuition, and we need to use 
concepts to organise the materials in order to yield objects. We can at least say that, 
with intuitive understanding, for which objects are spontaneously "perceived"^^ 
without depending on givenness, the conceptual distinction between actuality and 
possibility makes no sense. Al l that is there for such kind of understanding is actual 
{ibid.). Moreover, when objects are actually there without being given, as in the case 
of intuitive understanding, no concepts are required, as all objects are for this kind of 
understanding intuitively, spontaneously “perceived.” One should not forget that it is 
the peculiar condition of our cognition that we need to have concepts in order to 
constitute objects out of the given manifolds of sensibility. When objects are 
intuitively "perceived," no concepts are required. As a result, the discursivity of our 
understanding means a demand of conceptual operation upon constitution of objects 
out of sensible manifolds. While an intuitive understanding means a complete 
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spontaneous, unconditioned, necessary "perception" of objects. 
In the above I pointed out that objects for intuitive understanding are necessary, 
because the “perception，，of objects is not conditioned by sensibility, nothing would 
be left contingent to such kind of understanding. For us, as we are dependent on the 
sensible givenness, the materials provided are contingent; we cannot determine a 
91 It might even be said that for intuitive understanding, there is no perception but sole creation-, as 
strictly speaking, without any need of sensible givenness (receptivity), it is senseless to speak of 
cognition of any kind. (Or such "cognition" would be entirely alien to us and cannot be grasped by 
our understanding, as the only cognition we know is that which demands the sensible givenness) 
92 For the different senses of intuitive understanding Kant provided throughout his critical period, 
one can refer to Kenneth R. Westphal's article and his reference to Moltke Gram. See Kenneth R. 
Westphal, "Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of ‘the，Intuitive Intellect," in The Reception of Kant's Critical 
Philosophy: Fichte. Schelling, and Hegel, Sally Sedgwick ed., (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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priori what is there to be given. However, for intuitive understanding all objects are 
necessary, as they are the unconditioned and spontaneous "perception." As a result, 
it is possible for intuitive understanding to proceed "from the synthetically universal 
(the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the 
parts" (CJ, 291，V，407). For such kind of understanding, it is possible to intuit the 
whole of nature; moreover, all parts belong to this whole of nature is necessary as 
they are not conditioned by any givenness, not as in the case of our understanding. I f 
we can conceive of an intuitive understanding, where the relationship between the 
parts and the whole is necessary, contrary to that of our understanding where the 
relationship is contingent, then a second peculiarity of our cognitive power occurs. 
When we use our power of judgement, it is required that certain harmony between 
the particulars and the universal, although this harmony is contingent (CJ, 291, V, 
406f.). For this I have shown in my interpretation of the schematism, the harmony 
between the universal and the particular is the subjective condition of our power of 
judgement. While on the other hand, the harmony between the particulars and the 
universal for intuitive understanding is a necessary one. Kant thought that we can 
conceive of the harmony in our judgement as necessary relative to intuitive 
understanding (CJ, 291, V，407). Kant wanted to tell us that i f we can at least 
conceive of the possibility of a harmony in our judgement we must at the same time 
be able to conceive of an intuitive understanding, for which the harmony is 
necessary {ibid). 
To summarize the above points before going further, the peculiarity of our 
cognitive power is this: our understanding is necessarily a discursive (CJ, 291, V, 
407) one, meaning that we depend on the givenness in intuition in order to yield 
cognition. As a result, our understanding cannot determine how the particular 
objects of nature are arranged with reference to the systematic whole, as they are 
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given. Our understanding is actually conditioned by the given, hence we can never 
have a determinative concept of the whole, which could determine its parts; we 
actually start from taking up the parts, and with the demand of our reason for the 
uncondit ioned, hoping that a whole could be reached somehow (although it can 
never be reached in theoretical cognition). However, upon connecting the universals 
with the particulars, our power of judgement requires that there are harmonies 
between them. Yet, this harmony is contingent to us. In order to give a possible 
ground to this harmony, we must be able to think of another kind of understanding 
that is intuitive, which having this harmony as necessary. Up to this point, one might 
be very confused about this talk of an intuitive understanding. What are the real 
features of this understanding, except we can formally say that it has an absolute 
spontaneity and hence it determines its particulars with necessity? To us, an absolute 
spontaneity as intuitive understanding is absolutely alien. Our conception or thought 
of this kind of understanding that is intuitive, Kant thought, would be the crucial 
point upon explicating the technic of our power of judgement. 
When we try to understand this kind of intuitive understanding, we are trying to 
present “the possibility of the parts, in their character and combination, as dependent 
in the whole" (CJ, 292, V, 407). There is no way for us to understand this kind of 
possibility directly but through an analogy. We present this possibility with an 
analogy of our purposive character of practice: 
The only way that we can present the possibility of parts as 
dependent on the whole is by having the presentation of 
[the] whole contain the basis that makes possible the form 
of that whole as well as the connection of the parts required 
to [make] this [form possible]. Hence such a whole would 
be an effect, a product, the presentation of which is 
regarded as the cause that makes the product possible. But 
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the product of a cause that determines its effect merely on 
the basis of the presentation of that effect is called a 
purpose. (CJ, 292’ V，408) 
From the above we can see that we can only understand a whole that can sufficiently 
determine its parts as having a purposive structure. It is because the only activity 
that is known to us, which determines with necessity the parts in a whole, is that of 
our practice. In our practice, Kant thought that we do not wait until the particulars to 
be given, but we can sufficiently determine our actions with necessity, independent 
of the given. Hence, the only activity that we can know for certain, and which 
determines with the view of totality and necessity, is the purposive action of our 
practice. When we try to present the possibility of an intuitive understanding, we 
must analogically refer it to our practice as purposive actions. 
It is also why our power of judgement is technical. Due to the peculiarity of our 
cognitive power, that whenever we reflect on nature as a whole, we necessarily 
present it as purposive; it is the only way that we can properly explain how the 
whole of nature can be systematically organised. As a result, Kant wrote: 
It follows from this that the fact that we present [certain] 
products of nature as possible only in terms of a kind of 
causality that differs from the causality of the natural laws 
pertaining to matter, namely, the causality of purposes and 
final causes, is merely a consequence of the special 
character of our understanding (CJ, 292, V，408) 
This is the subtle reasoning by which we slip the purposiveness of nature into our 
reflection of nature. The purposiveness of nature is neither given from nature, nor is 
our concept of purposive practice directly applied to nature. The peculiarity of our 
cognitive power, where our understanding is discursive and conditioned by 
sensibility, renders this analogical reflection of nature's purposiveness as necessary 
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(CJ, 288，V，404). 
In the above I have discussed how the peculiarity of our cognitive power 
renders possible and indeed necessary a technic of our power of judgement. 
Moreover, due to this technic of judgement, we can make better sense of the basis of 
our reflection on nature as purposive. Upon the presupposition or the conceiving of 
an intuitive understanding that would render a determinative concept of whole 
possible, Kant thought that this presupposition or conceiving points to a 
supersensible substrate of nature's reality (CJ, 293, V，409), which we cannot 
cognize, yet, it must be possible. This issue would ultimately take us back to the 
problem I have presented in the opening of this thesis, that Kant's system of 
philosophy requires a transition towards the supersensible in order to ground itself. I 
shall, at the moment closing this chapter, discuss in brief how Kant saw this 
presupposed intuitive understanding as the supersensible substrate of all reality. 
I would like to take us back to the beginning of this section, and recapitulate the 
cause of these talks of an intuitive understanding. The theoretical reason for Kant to 
introduce the idea of an intuitive understanding is that there is a seeming conflict 
between our mechanistic principle of nature's constitution and our technical 
principle of reflection on nature. As in the case of other antinomies, this conflict 
between the two principles can be solved by the transcendental idealism. Kant said 
thus: 
But in fact it is at least possible to consider the material 
world as mere appearance, and to think something as [its] 
substrate, as thing in itself (which is not appearance), and to 
regard this thing in itself as based on a corresponding 
intellectual intuition (even though not ours). In that way 
there would be for nature, which includes us as well, a 
supersensible basis of its reality, though we could not 
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cognize this basis. (CJ, 293, V, 409) 
Keeping the realm of our cognition as appearance makes possible rooms for a 
supersensible realm of things in themselves. The supersensible basis of reality, Kant 
thought, would be a basis that could somehow reconcile the principle of mechanism 
with the teleological principle of nature (CJ, 297’ V, 412). This supersensible basis, 
of course, can never be an object of cognition. As a result, Kant thought that the two 
principles mentioned above cannot be reconciled in a determinative judgement, and 
hence no explanation {Erkldrung) (explication) of the reconciliation is possible. 
Erkldrung is for Kant a technical term, which he explicated in third Critique as "to 
derive...from principle, and hence we must be able to cognize and state this 
principle distinctly" {ibid.)?^ This implies that the supersensible basis that makes 
possible a reconciliation of the two principles is not one that we could cognise and 
state distinctly. However, this basis is for Kant something that "allows examination 
(Erdrterung) (exposition) of this possibility [that of the reconciliation]" (ibid.). The 
exposition of the possibility of the reconciliation between the two principles is our 
analogical conceiving of an intuitive understanding as the supreme cause of the 
world. It is because the supersensible basis of reality is transcendent (CJ, 298, V, 
413); the only way that would make this basis understandable (verstdndlich) to us 
would be the analogical grasping of the intuitive understanding as discussed above. 
The intuitive understanding, as understood as the purposive cause of the world, 
allows both a mechanism and teleology of nature. Nature is possible as teleological 
to intuitive understanding because he/she proceeds from the whole to its parts; while 
nature could also possibly be mechanistic, because a mechanistic view of nature is 
solely for human. To this intuitive understanding, how human beings see the world 
93 Also in CPR, Kant contrast philosophical Erkldrung with mathematical definition {Definition). He 
thought that "philosophical definitions are brought about only analytically through concepts' 
dissection" (CPR, A730/B758). 
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does not in anyway bother him/her. It is only sensible to speak about reconciliation 
from human point of view, as it is only us who find the two principles conflicting, 
and that we demand it to be reconciled. Presupposing such an intuitive 
understanding as the supersensible substrate of all reality helps us to reconcile the 
two principles. 
As a result, it is natural while being peculiar for human to presuppose such kind 
of supreme cause as the supersensible substrate of the world. I shall in the following 
chapter discuss the status of this supersensible substrate after Kant's account of the 
transition as reflection power of judgement. I will also in the conclusion point out a 
few problems left in this account, which influenced the development of the 
subsequent idealistic and romantic movement of German philosophy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Problems and Legacy of Kant's Concepts of Reflective Judgement 
and Supersensible Substrate 
“Al l thought is immoral. Its very essence 
is destructive. I f you think of anything, 
you kill it. Nothing survives being 
thought of." 
Oscar Wilde, A Woman of No Importance 
I. Introduction: Recapitulation of the Systematic Problem of Kant's Philosophy 
It is actually surprising that Kant did not go back to the problem of the systematic 
unity of his philosophy after all the theoretical explications of the reflective power 
of judgement. Towards the end of the third Critique, Kant went on discussing the 
problem of moral theology and concluded the book without a word about the 
systematic problem he had outlined in the two introductions. Allison tries to point 
out that there was an obvious shift of focus when one compare the two introductions, 
I shall leave this issue aside first. Allison thinks that in the second introduction, 
which is the officially published one, Kant has shifted his focus from the systematic 
problem of his philosophy to the problem of bridging the immense gulf "between 
what happens according to the laws of nature and what ought to happen according to 
laws of freedom.，，94 I f Allison's observation is true, which I think indeed is to a 
certain extent,^^ then it could have been a good explanation for Kant not to have 
Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste, p. 201. 
95 One observation that, I think, will support Allison's reading would be the different section titles 
given by Kant the corresponding sections between two introductions. In the first introduction, the title 
of the section about the problem of transition {Ubergang) is "Encyclopaedic Introduction of the 
Critique of Judgment into the System of the Critique of Pure Reason" (CJ, 431, XX, 241); while it is 
"How Judgment Connects the Legislations of the Understanding and of Reason" (CJ, 35’ V，195) in 
the second introduction. The section title of that particular section in the first introduction is 
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gone back to the systematic problem of his philosophy. However, I think that even i f 
it is the case, the systematic problem of Kant's philosophy still remains. Moreover, 
after Kant's treatment of the supersensible substrate with reference to the reflective 
power of judgement, several problems related to his system of philosophy are 
actually revealed. I shall in the following recapture the systematic problem, which 
has been the guiding thread of my thesis, before discussing the concept of the 
supersensible after Kant's treatment of it in the third Critique. After that I shall 
conclude my thesis with a discussion of the problems left over by Kant's philosophy, 
I think which are sharpened through the critique of the reflective power of 
judgement. 
I started my thesis with a discussion of the demand of supersensible elements in 
Kant's first two Critiques. Through a reading of the Prolegomena, I have shown that 
critical philosophy is reason's self-criticism, which involves setting bounds to its 
own uses. Setting bound to reason's uses means differentiating between the 
supersensible conditions of experience and the sensible constitutive elements, 
through which illusive antinomy is avoided. However, this ability of transcendental 
differentiation demands that there is a power of human intellect that has certain 
connection to the supersensible, and Kant tried to show that reason is connected to 
the supersensible through its freedom. Only i f Kant could show that reason has a 
real connection to the supersensible, that the possibility of setting bounds to itself 
could be grounded. The possibility of reason's setting bounds to itself is the very 
possibility of any philosophical reflection of reason's uses, which aims at avoiding 
possible illusion and illegitimate claims by human intellect. As a result, the very 
possibility of Kant's critical philosophy hinges on reason's connection to the 
supersensible. 
obviously more oriented to the systematic problem of Kant's philosophy. 
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I have as well argued in the first chapter that, there is certain regulative activity 
of reason that would render possible the transcendental differentiation between the 
sensible and the supersensible. Reason unifies human cognition as a systematic unity 
in a regulative way. Reason's principle of the greatest possible continuation and 
expansion of experience {Grundsatz der grdfitmdglichen Fortsetzung und 
Erweiterung der Erfahrung) (CPR, A509/B537) directs understanding to a certain 
goal. It avoids human taking what is unconditioned, which refers actually to the 
totality of our experience, as object of cognition. This character of reason's 
regulative activity is in the other words an ability of reason's self-criticism. 
Moreover, as a logical principle reason also requires us "to diminish as much as 
possible this seeming diversity" {ibid., A649/B677) of cognition and gives cognition 
a possible unity, or else there will be "no sufficient mark of empirical truth" {ibid., 
A651/B679). The systematic unity of our cognition is presupposed problematically 
instead of being a real cognition, as this unity is never given in any sensible 
intuition. 
From the above, we can see that supersensible elements are actually demanded 
in the theoretical part of critical philosophy. For one thing, this has to do with the 
possibility of critical philosophy itself. For another, the systematic regulative 
function of reason, as both related to the transcendental differentiation and to 
cognition as such, is as well presupposed. As a result, there has to be some way for 
Kant to ground reason's connection to the supersensible elements. 
Yet, this presupposition of the supersensible brings a serious problem. As 
human cognition is limited to that of the sensible, which is a discovery of reason's 
self-criticism, the very connection of reason to the supersensible cannot be a 
cognitive one. In the second Critique, Kant discovered that the sole legitimate 
human connection to the supersensible is human practice, which can be grounded in 
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moral practice. In human moral practice, freedom as a practically constituting 
supersensible is unveiled. This idea of freedom as the sole legitimate human 
supersensible, which determines and constitutes our practical activities, however, 
lacks any determinate cognitive content. As a result, although the human 
supersensible is grounded in freedom, the idea of the supersensible is still 
cognitively indeterminate. 
With the idea of the supersensible indeterminate cognitively yet determined in 
practice as freedom, an immense gulf is revealed between the two parts of Kant's 
philosophy. I f philosophical knowledge is to become a system in itself, and hence its 
very possibility is then to be grounded, then there must be some way to bridge this 
gulf in between. This problem seems to be a problem that Kant had wanted to deal 
with in the third Critique. Again, although Allison has pointed out that Kant might 
have shifted his focus from a systematic concern of critical philosophy to how 
freedom is to be actualized in nature, ^ ^ as seen from the rewriting of the 
introduction of the third Critique, I shall leave this problem aside first. I wil l account 
for this problem after the writing of the next section, which wil l be a section about 
the resulting concept of the supersensible after Kant's treatment of it in the third 
Critique. Basically, I wil l try to argue that; first, the systematic problem of critical 
philosophy can still be a genuine problem from a certain point of view. Secondly, 
that the so called shift of focus might be another way of addressing the systematic 
problem of Kant's philosophy. I wil l point out that there is actually a passage in the 
"Preface" of the published version of the third Critique that can be taken as the 
corresponding part about the systematic problem Kant mentioned in the "First 
Introduction." I f it is the case, then it might be plausible for us to claim that the 
systematic problem I formulated in the thesis still has a strong hold on the aim of the 
96 Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste, p. 203. 
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third Critique, and hence we could still demand an answer for the systematic 
problem from the book itself. 
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II. The Supersensible Substrate as seen through Reflective Power of Judgement 
In the above chapter I have discussed how Kant argued that it is necessary for 
human cognition to conceive of an intuitive understanding as the supersensible 
substrate of all reality. Kant told us that it is due to the peculiarity of our cognitive 
power that we need to presuppose a different kind of understanding, one that is 
intuitive instead of discursive as that of human beings. The harmony of our 
judgement, one that renders the connection between the universal and the particulars 
possible, hinges on the possibility of conceiving such an intuitive understanding. 
However, precisely because our cognitive power is discursive and dependent on 
givenness, we cannot in any direct cognitive sense understand such an idea of 
intuitive understanding. We must analogically refer this idea to our purposive 
practice, in which freedom is unveiled as the only possible human supersensible. As 
we can only understand such an understanding analogically as purposive, it is 
precisely the reason why we can reflect on nature as purposiveness. The peculiarity 
of our cognitive power, which depends on givenness and yet demands systematicity, 
can only refer the systematic whole of nature to our own purposive practice and 
presuppose nature as purposiveness. Our reflection on nature as technical actually 
bases on our power of judgement as being technical due to the peculiarity of human 
cognition. 
The introduction of the intuitive understanding as the supersensible substrate of 
all reality, where it is conceivable due to our peculiar reflective power of judgement, 
gives three theoretical consequences that I would like to point out here. The 
supersensible substrate, both subjectively and objectively speaking, 97 is 
97 The intuitive understanding that grounds teleological judgement is objective, while the aesthetic 
idea that grounds taste is subjective (CJ, 212-217, V’ 339-344). Werner S. Pluhar tried to reconcile 
these two ideas as one supersensible, c.f. Werner S. Pluhar, "Translator's Introduction," In Critique of 
Judgment, Werner S. Pluhar trans., (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 
pp. cii-civ. I do not want to discuss his attempt here, but I am convinced that the supersensible 
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indeterminate, analogical, and "subjective" to the final analysis. 
Kant in both the antinomy of taste and the antinomy of teleological judgement 
pointed out that the supersensible substrate that wil l resolve these antinomies is 
indeterminate. When we claim that a judgement of taste is necessary, we base that 
on an indeterminate concept (CJ, 213, V，341). This indeterminate concept of taste is 
the aesthetic idea, which is an intuition "according to a merely subjective principle 
of the mutual harmony of the cognitive powers" (CJ, 215, V, 342). This idea is 
indeterminate and hence cannot become cognition, because there is no adequate 
concept that can expound it (ibid.). The harmony between the cognitive power of 
imagination and understanding that gives rise to aesthetic pleasure can never be 
itself an object of cognition. As a result, the thesis of the antinomy of taste claims 
that there can be no dispute by means of proof for taste (CJ, 211，V，338). On the 
other hand, the antithesis claims that taste is based on concepts, or else we could 
claim a judgement of taste necessary {ibid.). Kant thinks that in order for us to 
resolve this antinomy and not contradicting the result of the analytic of taste, taste 
must be based on a concept, or idea, yet it is not a determinate one. This 
indeterminate idea of taste makes us possible to lay necessary claim to taste, while 
not entailing any conceptual proof. This indeterminate, or more precisely 
unexpoundable, aesthetic idea could be considered as "the supersensible substrate of 
humanity" (CJ, 213，V，340). 
For the antinomy of teleological judgement, the problem is how the mechanical 
principle and the teleological principle can be reconciled. Kant told us that in order 
to reconcile them, there must be a further principle that "lies beyond both" (CJ, 297, 
V’ 412). This basis of nature is the supersensible, which we can only have an 
substrate is essentially one, as it is taken by Kant as the ground of the harmony in the power of 
judgement in general, no matter i f it is employed subjectively in taste or objectively in teleology. 
Chapter Three 115 
indeterminate concept of {ibid). As a result, for us we can "only point to it" {ibid.) 
but never cognize it. 
This pointing-to the supersensible is the basic structure of reflective judgement. 
We can only analogically point to the concept of the supersensible, through referring 
it to our purposive practice. This is the very basis of the technic of judgement, which 
proceeds in accordance with the purposiveness of nature. We must assume that 
nature is purposive, in order to proceed to the linking between the universal and the 
particulars through the act of judgement. 
Moreover, this presupposition of a supersensible substrate and understanding it 
as a purposive intuitive understanding is due to the peculiarity of our cognitive 
power. It is precisely because we are dependent on sensible givenness, yet reason 
demands a systematic unity of cognition, we need judgement to bring these two ends 
of cognitive demands into harmony. However, the basis of this harmony is itself not 
cognizable. I call this demand of a supersensible substrate subjective, because it is 
go 
due to the subjective condition of our cognitive power. 
After pointing out the theoretical consequences of Kant's treatment of the 
supersensible substrate in the third Critique, I shall go back to discuss the systematic 
problem of his philosophy I set forth throughout my thesis with reference to these 
consequences. I shall give an account on why this problem may still be a genuine 
problem, although some contemporary Kantian scholars have been trying to avoid 
this through shifting the focus of the third Critique to a different aim. 
98 Although it must be noted that, this peculiarity of our cognitive power is transcendentally 
objective, as it is necessary and universal to all human cognitive subjects. 
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III. An Indeterminate Ground of Critical Philosophy 
I have pointed out repeatedly that there is a tension between the two parts of the 
Kantian philosophy, namely that between the theoretical and the practical. I have 
also argued that i f this tension is not to be solved, then there is a strong reason for 
one to be sceptical towards the possibility of critical philosophy. Although reason's 
connection to the supersensible is grounded in human practice, yet the supersensible 
elements required in theoretical cognition still remains a presupposition, as there are 
major difference between human practical activities and cognitive activities. We can 
never directly equate the practical supersensible with the supersensible elements 
assumed in cognition. As a result, Kant tried to formulate a transition (Ubergang) 
between them. This transition through reflective power of judgement refers all 
cognitive powers to the supersensible (CJ, 434’ XX, 244), and that would eventually 
unify our system of mind. Through this we seem to have grounded the supersensible 
elements of cognition in a certain way, as it is the necessary demand due to the 
peculiarity of our cognitive powers. 
The above is what Kant seemed to have implied in the "First Introduction" of 
the third Critique. Allison wanted to argue that with the rewriting of the introduction, 
Kant has redirected the aim of his treatise through a "sharpening of the problem.”今今 
He told us that the aim of the writing of the third Critique is to show how freedom 
can be realized in sensible w o r l d . A l l i s o n made this claim by distinguishing 
between the two levels of the problem of nature and freedom; which the two levels 
are the transcendental level and the empirical-anthropological level. For him, the 
problem of nature and freedom at the transcendental level is "whether free agency is 
compatible with the causality of nature,” ⑴i and he thought that the question is 
购 Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste, p. 201. 
Ibid., p. 203. 
Ibid., p. 205. 
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answered positively in the third antinomy of the first Critique. The 
empirical-anthropological level, for him, "becomes whether the ends dictated by the 
'laws of freedom' (moral laws) are realizable in the sensible w o r l d . " H e then 
claimed that the account of reflective judgement Kant provided is more directed to 
the latter level of the problem of nature and freedom, and hence he direct our 
attention to the moral significance of taste, lo^  Moreover, Allison also appealed to 
the fact that, in the last section of the published introduction, Kant has reformulated 
the problem as how to make the supersensible substrate, which is determined by 
reason as freedom, determinable “by the intellectual power'' (CJ, 37, V, 196).i04 He 
then thinks that Kant has in the published third Critique shifted his focus on this 
problem instead of the systematic problem I have set forth here. I wil l first point out 
that there is actually another passage in the preface of the third Critique that refers to 
that systematic problem. Pointing out this can at least show that the systematic 
problem of Kantian philosophy might still have weight to Kant at the time of 
publication of the third Critique, instead of what Allison has proposed as a total shift 
of aim. Secondly, I wil l show again that this systematic problem of critical 
philosophy is still a genuine problem from a certain point of view, for that I wil l 
refer to the accounts of Kant's system by other scholars. 
A passage that Kant has written and published as a part of the preface of the 
third Critique shows that Kant was still in some way concerned with the systematic 
problem I set forth. I shall quote the paragraph in the following. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 210. I do not deny that the problem of the moral significance of taste is one of the most 
interesting topics of the study of the third Critique. Indeed, problems in philosophical aesthetics, 
especially those with reference to human destination and ideal, have always been my interest. 
However, I do want to point out that shifting the focus of the third Critique does not imply 
automatically that the systematic problem of Kant's philosophy should not be answered within the 
context of the third. 
Ibid., p. 208f. 
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A critique of pure reason, i.e., of our ability to judge 
according to a priori principles, would be incomplete i f it 
failed to include, as a special part, a treatment of judgment, 
which, since it is a cognitive power, also lays claim to a 
priori principles.. .For i f a system of pure philosophy, under 
the general title metaphysics, is to be achieved some 
day...the critique must already have explored the terrain 
(Boden) supporting this edifice, to the depth at which lies 
the first foundation of our power of principles independent 
of experiences, so that no part of the edifice may give way, 
which would inevitably result in the collapse of the whole. 
(CJ, 5,V, 168)1。5 
We can see from the above quoted passage that Kant might imply the aim of the 
treatise a lot more than merely showing the determinability of freedom in sensible 
world. The italic parts show that Kant wanted to ground a system of philosophy 
through completing it with a treatment of judgement. However, one should note that, 
quickly after this passage, Kant reminded us that the principle of judgement "only 
serves as a rule for the power of judgement i tsel f (CJ, 6, V，169). It means that this 
foundation of philosophy might not be a cognizable one. 
The above quoted passage should be enough to show that Kant possibly still 
had the systematic problem in mind at the time of publication of the third Critique. I 
shall in the following suggest that this so called shift of focus could be seen as a 
reformulation of the systematic problem. This systematic problem I formulated 
might not be merely confined to the empirical-anthropological level as Allison had 
argued, because, as I have mentioned numerous of time before, the possibility of a 
critical, philosophical self-reflection of reason hinges on the solution of this 
systematic problem. 
I have in this thesis formulated a systematic problem of Kantian philosophy. 
i。5 Italics are mine. 
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Generally speaking, the problem can be thought as how nature and freedom could 
eventually be unified in a system. I f I am allowed to apply preliminarily Allison's 
distinction (before resolving it at the end of my argument), then the problem of 
nature and freedom can be said to have two levels. He wanted to argue that the 
transcendental problem between nature and freedom had been resolved in the third 
antinomy of the first Critique; and in the third Critique Kant was trying to show how 
human freedom can be realized empirically in the sensible world of nature, and that 
taste would be a proper answer to this question. I do not want to dismiss this latter 
problem to be a genuine problem; however, I do want to point out that, first, the 
transcendental problem had not been answered properly before the writing of the 
third Critique. This point I have actually argued in the first chapter of this thesis. I 
argued that, the third antinomy of the first Critique had opened up a possibility of, or 
indeed, a necessity of, presupposing a supersensible realm of freedom. Moreover, 
the realm of supersensible freedom was later in second Critique grounded in human 
practice. However, the problem of the relationship between the presupposed 
supersensible in theoretical philosophy and the supersensible freedom in practical 
philosophy remains unsolved. Therefore, I think that the problem between nature 
and freedom has not been properly solved at the transcendental level. This actually 
has been the guiding thread of this thesis. 
Moreover, I have consistently argued that the possibility of solving the 
systematic problem of Kantian philosophy is actually concerning the possibility of 
reason's self-critical reflection. Solving the systematic problem grants reason the 
right of a philosophical reflection. As a result, the systematic problem concerns the 
right of philosophizing of human cognitive power. 
I f the above is true, which I hope that I have argued adequately before, then I 
would like to suggest that, throughout the third Critique, Kant has been concerning 
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with this right of human cognitive power. In both the accounts of the aesthetic 
judgement and teleological judgement, Kant tried to show us that there are certain 
peculiarities of human cognitive power that grant us the right of presuming a 
supersensible substrate of reality. The so called empirical-anthropological level of 
the problem, namely, how freedom is to be realized in nature in reality, actually 
refers to how it is possible for human to think, to cognise, or to see, that the 
realization is possible. As a result, I would like to suggest that in the third Critique, 
Kant was trying to solve the problem of how the two higher cognitive powers, 
namely, understanding and reason, could be unified in a system. The possibility of 
this unification hinges on the different peculiarities Kant has pointed out in the 
treatise itself, and this unification should eventually ground the possibility of 
reason's self-reflection, although, I shall point out in the following that to a certain 
point of view, there are still problems to be solved within his system. We can at least 
say that, the introduction of the power of judgement as one of the a priori higher 
cognitive powers has a transcendental aim, instead of a mere 
empirical-anthropological problem that Allison might have suggested. 
Indeterminate ground ofphilosophy; or the destination of human freedom? 
A lot of Kantian scholars nowadays ignore the systematic problem and concentrate 
instead on the so called empirical-anthropological problem in their interpretation of 
the third Critique; or at least, as Allison did, try to show that Kant has shifted his 
focus through a rewriting of the introduction. I shall first show that after the 
Paul Guyer is the other leading scholar that focuses significantly more on the second set of 
problem. See his two books related to the discussion of the third Critique, namely, Kant and the 
Claim of Taste, 2nd ed., (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)，and Kant 
and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). Also, in John H. Zammito's systematic study of the genesis of the third 
Critique, he also seems to suggest that the treatise eventually turns itself to the second set of problem, 
although in the conclusion he mentioned also the idealistic traits of the third Critique. See The 
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treatment of the reflective power of judgement, the systematic problem of critical 
philosophy is still not answered in a satisfactory way. This unsatisfactory answer 
found in the third Critique is one of the sources leading to the development of the 
idealistic and romantic philosophy. The following discussion wil l eventually show 
that the systematic problem I formulated in this thesis could still be a genuine 
problem from certain point of view, despite the possible shift in focus by Kant in the 
third Critique. Nevertheless, I do not want to argue that the 
empirical-anthropological problem is not a genuine problem. The problem of 
realization of freedom in the sensible world is a problem that must be answered 
properly; indeed, one of Kant's immediate successors, Friedrich Schiller, tried to 
tackle this problem with great concern. I shall in the following first discuss how one 
may find the possible answer provided in the third Critique unsatisfactory to the 
systematic problem of critical philosophy. 
My discussion of the possibly unsatisfactory answer provided wil l be centred to 
the three theoretical consequences of the treatment of the reflective power of 
judgement I mentioned in the earlier section. The indeterminacy of the idea of the 
supersensible substrate means that the idea cannot be grasped directly in a cognitive 
fashion. We can only "point to it" with an analogical reflective judgement. However, 
one must not overlook, i f my argument has been correct, that reason's connection to 
this very idea of supersensible substrate could alone ground the critical philosophy. 
One must then decide whether an indeterminate, analogical connection could be a 
satisfactory one. Andrew Bowie has pointed out that there are aspects of Kant's 
philosophy, besides the supersensible substrate, that Kant has not adequately 
grounded. The indeterminacy of all these conditioning elements of Kant's 
Genesis of Kant 's Critique of Judgment, (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1992). 
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philosophy leads to the development of the successive idealistic and romantic 
philosophical movement, which I shall limit myself from giving an account here]。？ 
The other way of grounding the possibility of critical philosophy would be 
appealing to the subjective character of human cognitive powers, which is yet 
necessary and universal to human beings. One could argue that it is necessary and 
universal for human cognitive powers to presuppose such an analogical connection 
of reason to the supersensible. However, it is still arguable whether it is convincing 
to ground critical philosophy by appealing to a subjective need or demand of reason. 
Sceptics would still challenge Kant's grounding i f it is only a subjective demand or 
need of reason. They would think that, i f the establishment of the whole critical 
enterprise is only due to some sort of subjective demands or needs of the "so called" 
reason, then this sort of demand is no less the same as an illusion. This illusive 
building of a critical system is then merely for reason's subjective satisfaction. 
There are scholars who want to defend Kant against sceptics by appealing to 
the modesty of his system. They want to somehow dismiss the problem of 
scepticism by showing that Kant's critical philosophy is not directed against sceptics. 
Karl Ameriks in his book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy tried to argue that Kant's 
system should be appropriated as a modest system. ^ ^^  He thought that instead of 
viewing Kant's philosophy as an answer to the sceptics, it should be appropriated as 
a modest system that helps to make intelligible what is already known. He 
thought that Kant's philosophy follows the transcendental method of starting from 
what is known with certainty, for example, natural sciences and mathematics, and 
107 For the inadequate grounds of Kant's philosophical system pointed out by Andrew Bowie, see his 
Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd ed., (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), pp. 16-48. He gave an excellent summary of the development of the 
romantic and idealistic philosophy from Kant's problems in the part follows, see ibid., pp. 49-68. 
Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical 
Philosophy, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 37f. 
Ibid, p. 61. 
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seeking the condition of possibility of these sciences and knowledge. These 
transcendental grounds of the possibility of the known knowledge should be an 
adequate answer to the sceptics, as these grounds are necessary and universal. 
Here we should distinguish between the two kinds of scepticism, namely, the 
scepticism of the known knowledge and that of the possibility of a certain kind of 
philosophical reflection. Of course, through showing the conditions of possibility of 
cognition one could have adequately dismissed the scepticism of knowledge; 
however, the latter kind of scepticism still has its weight. I have mentioned in the 
first chapter that Kant in the Prolegomena has indeed pointed out that natural 
science and mathematics does not need a critique, as their limits are known to them 
internally. It is actually metaphysics and reason's employment that need a critical 
reflection. Therefore it seems to me that Kant's critical philosophy aims to prove 
more than the conditions of possibility of the known cognition, which Ameriks 
thought to have been successfully proved, but also to prove that reason is a 
legitimate source of this kind of critical reflection. Again, this hinges on the 
connection of reason to the supersensible. As a result, I do not want to dismiss 
Ameriks，appropriation of Kant's system as modest, indeed, it is what it should be. 
However, I do want to point out that, beyond justifying the conditions of possibility 
of known cognition, Kant's system still has an internal problem to solve. The 
internal problem is, namely, the legitimacy and necessity of the philosophical system 
itself; and an indeterminate and analogical ground as resulted from the third Critique 
leaves opened this problem for further development. 
After the above exposition, it is easy to see that why Kantian scholars have 
been trying to redirect their interpretation of the aim of the third Critique to the set 
of problems concerning the realization of freedom in the sensible world. The “two 
worlds" that we share, namely the sensible world of nature and the supersensible 
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world of freedom, remain to a large extent intact even i f the systematic problem of 
critical philosophy is not properly answered. Hence, the remaining problem would 
then be how freedom is realized. Indeed, Friedrich Schiller was inspired by Kant's 
writing and further developed his own reflection concerning the problem of freedom, 
because as Henrich pointed out, Schiller "was forced into philosophizing by the 
problem of human nature, the duality of its both sensuous and rational character, and 
by the problem of the moral standard of human action and the possibility of its 
perfection.’’ Instead of thinking about systematic philosophical problems, he is 
forced into philosophy by the real interest of human freedom's destination. I could 
say that this other direction of philosophizing could be a plausible development of 
philosophy after Kant.‘丨 ^  
Dieter Henrich, "Beauty and Freedom: Schiller's Struggle with Kant's Aesthetics," in Essays in 
Kant's Aesthetics, Ted Cohen & Paul Guyer ed., (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), p. 243. Schiller's influences to the successive development of German philosophy are 
actually one of the most interesting topics of classical German philosophy. I have included numerous 
of books and articles that is related to this topic in the bibliography of this thesis for reference. 
"1 I could not have discussed this other direction of philosophizing by Schiller in this thesis, 
although it has been one of the causes for my interest and realization of a study of the third Critique. 
Basically, Schiller thought that human freedom could only be realized through an Aesthetic 
Education. This direction of tackling the problem between nature and freedom, I think, is not at all 
concerned with any systematic problem of philosophy. This direction of thinking might actually be 
what the contemporary Kantian scholars have tried to redirect to, as the so called 
empirical-anthropological level. As a result, I think Schiller is actually an important figure for another 
independent research, which I hope I could do in the future. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
I have in this chapter explicated how the result of the third Critique could provide an 
answer to the systematic problem I set forth throughout the thesis, and have shown 
that the possible answers provided might have led to the successive development of 
both idealism and romanticism. This shows that the systematic problem of critical 
philosophy still has its weight to certain point of view. On the other hand, I have 
shown that it is understandable why there has been a redirection of Kantian study 
that focuses more on the problem of freedom's realization. Among them, Friedrich 
Schiller might have been a pioneer. 
I do not want to claim that there is an absolute direction of development of 
philosophy. The problem of the very possibility of philosophy itself always demands 
a rigorous answer; while the realization of the results of philosophical studies is 
equally important. What I do want to point out is that, there are problems opened in 
the end, and this openness of Kant's philosophy might be what makes him important 
and interesting as a historical figure of philosophy. 
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CONCLUSION 
I started off this thesis with the problem of the possibility of transcendental 
philosophy in mind. I have shown that this possibility of transcendental philosophy 
hinges on reason's connection to the supersensible. The connection of reason to the 
supersensible is an indication of reason's attempt to arrive at the greatest possible 
extension of its boundaries. In chapter one, I gave a detailed analysis of these issues 
with reference to passages from the first Critique and the Prolegomena. I argued that 
the supersensible could only be problematically presupposed, as it is cognitively 
indeterminate. I proceeded to point out that the reality of the connection could only 
be proved from another activity of human beings, namely, the practical activity of 
humankind. 
In the analysis of human practice provided in the second Critique, Kant showed 
that practical freedom is the real connection of reason to the supersensible. However, 
the problematically presupposed supersensible in the theoretical part of philosophy 
and freedom as the supersensible in the practical part of philosophy must be 
reconciled, or else these two parts of philosophy will not constitute a system. 
Without a systematic whole that unifies these parts, reason would be in conflict with 
itself. Moreover, in order to unify these parts, a supersensible substrate that could 
reconcile the presupposed supersensible in theoretical philosophy and the 
supersensible freedom in practical philosophy is demanded. An establishment of this 
supersensible substrate of reality, to which reason is somehow connected, renders 
critical philosophy possible. Al l these taken together, Kant has shown us, are 
precisely what the power of reflective judgement provides us with. 
Through the analyses of both aesthetic and teleological judgement, we handled 
the problem of the supersensible substrate in the third Critique. The supersensible 
substrate was introduced by Kant as an intuitive understanding. This idea of intuitive 
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understanding, due to the limit of our cognitive powers, could only be analogically 
understood as a purposive cause of the world. Although we do not process any 
determinate cognition of this substrate, Kant wanted to argue that, it is due to certain 
peculiarity of our cognition that we must presume the existence of this substrate and 
understand it analogically in terms of purpose. 
I have in the end argued that this quality of the supersensible substrate, as being 
analogical, might not be a satisfactory answer to the question of the possibility of 
Kantian philosophy. I have suggested that this unsatisfactory answer might be one of 
the causes leading to the successive development of both idealism and romanticism. 
I wanted to show that, although some contemporary Kantian scholars tried very hard 
to avoid the systematic problem in Kant, the importance of this problem remains. I 
think that a good grasp of this problem would be an effective way to understand the 
development of idealism and romanticism. As I have mentioned many times before, 
the success or failure of the grounding of reason's philosophical reflection hinges on 
the establishment of its connection to the supersensible. Now Kant has indeed 
embarked upon this in a thematized and sharpened manner. Kant had provided us 
with an analogical answer to this connection; we must decide ourselves, with 
justification, whether such an analogical answer is adequate enough or not. 
§ 
To conclude, there are a few things that I hope could be the fruits of this thesis. First 
of all, I hope my reformulation of the systematic problem of Kantian philosophy, as 
related to the possibility of reason's philosophical self-reflection, could shed light on 
the possible path of further Kantian research. I think philosophical vocation in line 
with Kant might subsequently take two directions. One might take Schiller's 
direction by applying results of Kant's philosophical reflection on mundane matters 
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of humanity. In Schiller's case, he developed a theory of aesthetic education by 
applying the fruits of Kant's philosophy. The other direction, I think, would be the 
further reflection of the grounds of philosophy itself. This very direction of 
philosophy is precisely what Kant has started, though unsatisfactorily, and what has 
been resumed by the idealist and the romantics, owing to its lasting importance. Of 
course, I do not mean that these two directions of philosophical reflection exclude 
each other or are mutually exhaustive. They might even be related in some ways. I 
only want to show that these two directions are real choices for us. 
The other fruits I hope to get from this thesis would be a preparation for my 
future research. As I have mentioned above, a good grasp of the problems I worked 
out in this thesis could be a handy way to understand better the development of 
idealistic and romantic philosophy. As these two trends of philosophical 
development have always been among my interests, I thought, it would be a good 
idea to start from the problem left by Kant's system. 
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